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ON THE TACTICS OF POLICE-PROSECUTION
ORIENTED CRITICS OF THE COURTS*
Yale Kamisarf
INTRODUCTION
Lack of public understanding of the police purpose and what the police
must do to accomplish it [and] . . . ignorance of the facts involved in
the war against crime in a free society continue unabated ... because the
police are not a vocal, scholarly group that devotes much time to presenting
in a favorable light the facts that bear on the problem. The literature in
consequence is principally devoted to the case against police; little has been
written in their defense. The press, the literature, and even case law are
all directed at incidents that discredit the police.1
So claims Orlando W. Wilson, Superintendent of the Chicago Police
Department. If this situation ever existed, he had done his best to
remedy it. Since March of 1962, the Superintendent has testified before
the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia,' published an article
in a leading professional journal,8 addressed a panel discussion group
of the American Bar Association,4 and been "interviewed" by a national
magazine.' He seems to adhere to the view that the best defense is a
good offense. His principal targets have been the courts.
Chief Wilson is not alone. For example, in recent months, Stanley R.
Schrotel, Chief of the Cincinnati Police Department, and President of
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, who shares Wilson's
unhappiness about the inarticulateness of policemen,8 testified before
* Part of this article was presented orally at the Cornell Law School on March 20, 1964,
under the auspices of the Cornell Legal Aid Clinic.
Of course, a commentator who is critical of the Court's performance in the constitutional-
criminal procedure area is not necessarily police-prosecution oriented. This article focuses on
criticism characterized by hyperbole, not criticism possegsing "that quality of judiciousness
. . . demanded of the Court itself." Freund, "The Court and its Critics," in The Supreme
Court of the United States 177-(1961). Critics such as Professors Edward Barrett and Frank
Remington have amply demonstrated that in this field as in others the only alternatives
open to observers of the Court need not-and should not-be "unbridled abuse or indiscrim-
inate praise." Ibid.
t Professor of Law, the University of Minnesota. A.B. 1950, New York University; LL.B.
1954, Columbia University. Co-editor [with W. B. Lockhart & J. H. Choper], Constitutional
Law: Cases, Comments and Questions (1964).
1 Wilson, 'Tolice Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization," in
Police Power and Individual Freedom 21, 25 (Sowle ed. 1962).
2 Hearings on H.R. 7525 and S. 486 Before the Senate Committee on the District of
Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Senate Hearings].
3 Wilson, "Police Authority in a Free Society," 54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 175 (1963).
4 Wilson, How Do We Live with Mallory, Mapp and Sun? (unpublished comments of
Aug. 13, 1963, in the University of Minnesota Law Library).
5 "What To Do About Crime in the Big Cities," U.S. News & World Report, March 12,
1962, p. 67.
6 See 1963 Senate Hearings 290-91.
CRITICS OF THE COURTS
the same Senate committee,7 was "interviewed" by the same national
magazine,' and appeared on "Meet the Press."9
To head off the growth of crime, maintains Chief Schrotel, "the most
important thing for honest people to do" is to "be alert and vocal in
defense of all the forces of law and order. They should make as much
noise as the highly vocal elements who seek to derogate the police image
by constant harassment." 10 In the meantime, the Chief is making a
great deal of "noise" on his own.
Perhaps that he is adding to the "noise" would be a more accurate
description. For it has been some time now since anyone has cared to
question the lung power of such lusty critics of the courts as Chicago
Crime Commission Director Virgil Peterson, Professors Fred Inbau
and Johri Barker Waite, Prosecutors J. F. Coakley and Edward Silver,
Chiefs Robert Murray and William Parker." This "noise" is the sub-
ject of this article.
CRIME CAUSATION: ONE SCAPEGOAT FINDS ANOTIER
There was a time when William H. Parker, Chief of the Los Angeles
Police Department, seemed to appreciate the complexities of the "crime
problem." In a 1952 speech, he warned that "I will disappoint anyone
who expects to find here an easy formula for preventing crime."' 2 More-
over, he pointed out: "Law enforcement officers are neither equipped
nor authorized to deal with broad social problems. We do not control
economic cycles; we are not equipped to deal with racial, religious, or
political prejudice .... ,13
Along these same lines, he observed two years later:
The police service has benefited greatly from ... improved technology.
.But the answer has not yet been found.
Despite the technology that has been acquired through no small effort
and expense, the police service today fulfills its task with no greater
success than it did a quarter or half-century ago. This is a damaging
accusation, but it is susceptible of proof. As inaccurate as our statis-
tics are, they leave little doubt that the crime rate has been on the
increase for the past several decades-the identical years in which the
American police have shown their greatest technical progress. It is
7 Ibid.
8 "Will City Streets Ever Be Safe Again?" U.S. News & World Report, April 8, 1963,
p. 80.
9 Transcript of "Meet the Press," presented on NBC, May 5, 1963, on file in the University
of Minnesota Law Library.
10 "Will City Streets Ever Be Safe Again?" supra note 8, at 83. See also text accompanying
note 203 infra.
11 Citations to the writings and speeches of these commentators are scattered throughout
this article.
12 Parker, "Crime and Belief," in Parker, Police 11-12 (Wilson ed. 1957).
13 Ibid.
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highly doubtful that our present crime rate is any lower than that which
accompanied the brawling, lusty period of the nation's formation-years
in which organized police protection scarcely existed.
... . Indeed, our most accurate crime statistics indicate that crime
rates rise and fall on the tides of economic, social, and political cycles
with embarrassingly little attention to the most determined efforts of our
police.
14
Those familiar with Chief Parker's recent contributions to the litera-
ture may be surprised at these sober appraisals of crime and its causes.
Conspicuously absent from these early observations are any references
to "handcuffing" rules of evidence, "misguided" courts, and "starry-
eyed" liberals. But this, I repeat, was 1952 and 1954.
A short month after the second of Parker's forementioned observa-
tions, the Supreme Court of the United States castigated his police de-
partment for making repeated illegal entries into an alleged book-
maker's home, first to install a secret microphone and then to move it
into the bedioom and the bedroom closet, in order to listen to the con-
versations of the occupants-for over a month."6 Although he insisted
that state law authorized such invasions of privacy, Chief Parker
"stopped it voluntarily . . because I would not let a policeman go out
and play footsie with the gates of a Federal prison."'1 6 A year later, in
the famous People v. Cahan,'7 the California Supreme Court overturned
precedents of more than thirty years' standing to adopt the exclusionary
rule in search and seizure cases.
These decisions furnished the Chief with the "easy formula for pre-
venting crime" he had once thought nonexistent. They apparently
caused the Chief to forget all about (1) "economic, social and, political
cycles"; (2) his concession-prior to these cases-that improved tech-
nology had failed to lower the crime rate; and (3) the apparent fact
that "the crime rate has been on the increase for the past several
decades."
The Chief continued to talk-about the continuing rise in crime "since
1954, which was the year of Irvine, and the year before Cahan."'8 He
continued to bemoan that "we are spending a tremendous amount of
14 Parker, "The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities," Annals, Jan. 1954, pp. 5, 11-12.
15 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
16 Transcript of "Are Eavesdropping and Wiretapping Desirable Methods of Enforcing
the Law?" presented on NBC's "The Nation's Future," July 8, 1961, reprinted in Hearings
on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, and S. 1822 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 526, 536 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Debate].
These fears were somewhat exaggerated. See Letter of Feb. 15, 1955, From Warren Olney
HI, then Assistant United States Attorney General, on file with the Stanford Law Review,
reprinted in part in Comment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 76, 94 n.75 (1954).
17 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
18 Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Debate 533. [Emphasis added.]
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money without the real reward that we should be getting in the way of
services rendered,"' 9 but now the reason was obvious: by preventing
police, inter alia, from intercepting communications "by electronic
means ...we are making it almost impossible for these agencies to
meet the challenges that they face."2 0
Happily, not all law enforcement spokesmen view restrictive rules of
evidence as a principal cause of increased crime, or at least, not always.
In December of 1962, page one stories in the Minneapolis newspa-
pers21 quoted local police authorities to the effect that somehow a current
"burglary wave" was largely the product of the "tighter restrictions"
imposed on state and city police by Mapp v. Ohio." Relevant statistics
published some months later indicated that burglaries had increased
about ten per cent, but when the figures were released and the police
asked to account for them, the response was: "The burglars had a lot
better weather this year; no snow.
23
Bank robberies in the Nation's Capital almost doubled in the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1963.24 Here, surely, was overwhelming "proof"
that no police force-however carefully selected, however well trained
-could withstand the combined effects of the search and seizure re-
strictions and the McNabb-Mallory rule! 25 Or was it? Evidently the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation thought not. He never
mentioned any rules of evidence. Every one of the twenty-two bank
robberies which had occurred in the District in the past fiscal year,
explained J. Edgar Hoover, had taken place at a branch-type facility.
Such banks, he pointed out, are much more vulnerable to robbery;
they "have fewer security features and less police protection"; the
escape routes from the branch sites are more easily accessible and better
concealed.26
Why, on some ocassions, do the police offer such unsensational, equal-
ly plausible reasons for the increase in crime? I venture to say, largely
as a matter of self-defense. They fear the public will blame them.
As students of the crime problem have pointed out: "whenever the
newspapers carry a sensational headline about the rising tide of juvenile
19 Id. at 527.
20 Ibid.
21 Minneapolis Morning Tribune, Dec. 1, 1962; Minneapolis Evening Star, Dec. 1, 1962.
22 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23 Minneapolis Sunday Star & Tribune, May 5, 1963, Upper Midwest Section, p. 4, col. 4.
24 Washington Post, July 14, 1963, p. B1, col. 1.
25 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), as reaffirmed by Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), operates to exclude from federal prosecutions statements elicited
during unreasonably prolonged precommitment detention, whether or not they appear to
be voluntarily made.
26 Washington Post, note 24 supra.
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delinquency nationally, or about some shocking youth-gang depredation
locally," the question "likely to be raised in countless American homes"
is: "Why don't the police put a stop to it?"27
No police force, of course, can "put a stop to it." The men on the
"firing line" do not greatly affect the crime rate; not any more than do
the courts. Here, as elsewhere, it is tempting "to reconcile the delusion
of our omnipotence with the experience of limited power" by explaining
seeming failure in terms of incompetence, even betrayal2 8 Here, as
elsewhere, a "mood of irritated frustration with complexity" finds ex-
pression in "scapegoating."29 The great irony is that although the police
deeply-and righty-resent being made the "scapegoats," too many
of them have too few qualms about making the courts the "scapegoats."
In a recent speech, one in which he seriously doubted that the public
"can live" with the exclusionary rule, Superintendent 0. W. Wilson
voiced dismay at the persistent increase in crime. The fault, he suggested,
lies with the courts. 0 But, in the very same speech, he took pains to
point out that a major source of antagonism against the police is "a
tendency to blame [them] . . .for a high incidence of crime instead of
recognizing that there are many crime causes, such as slum conditions,
narcotic addiction, lack of parental responsibility, unemployment, cul-
tural inequalities, and other social factors over which the police have no
influence or control."'al
Hasn't the Superintendent missed something? Hasn't he overlooked
the fact that the courts have no influence or control over any of these
"social factors" either?
"CHANGE" IN SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS-OR SIMPLY COMPLIANCE?
Police and prosecutors strenuously resist what they like to call
"tighter restrictions" on their powers. But more often than not, what
they are really bristling about is tighter enforcement of long standing
restrictions. Thus, many in law enforcement reacted to the adoption of
the exclusionary rule as if the guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure had just been written! They talked as if and acted as if the
exclusionary rule were the guaranty against unreasonable search and
seizure. What disturbed them so much was that courts were now operating
on the same premise.
27 R. Brecher & E. Brecher, The Delinquent and the Law I (Public Affairs Pamphlet No.
337, 1962).
28 Hans f. Morgenthau quoted in Graebner, The New Isolationism 29 (1956). See gen-
erally Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress 109-16 (1957).
29 Id. at 109, 115.
30 Wilson, supra note 3, at 176.
31 Ibid.
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The post-Catan comments of the Los Angeles Chief of Police illus-
trate the point:
The actual commission of a serious criminal offense will not justify
affirmative police action until such time as the police have armed them-
selves with sufficient information to constitute "probable cause."
32
As long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California, your police
will respect it and operate to the best of their ability within the framework
of limitations imposed by that rule.33
Of course, the "framework of limitations" was imposed by the state
and federal constitutional guarantees, not the exclusionary rule. Of
course, so long as the state and federal constitutions were operative, a
criminal offense never justified "affirmative police action" unless and
until there was "sufficient information to constitute 'probable cause.'"
Is it unfair to ask the Chief why, prior to the 1955 California decision,
he permitted his officers to take "affirmative action" without bothering
to arm themselves with sufficient information to constitute "probable
cause"? Or to ask him why the police would only work within the
"framework of limitations" imposed by law "so long as the Exclusionary.
Rule is the law of California"?
In 1961, the states lost their option to adopt or reject the "exclu-
sionary rule." The landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio handed down in June
of that year, finally required-as a matter of federal constitutional
law-that all states exclude from criminal prosecutions evidence ob-
tained by means of an unreasonable search and seizure.
The impact of the Mapp case in Minnesota, which, like New York,
had up to that time admitted illegally seized evidence, is, I think, typical,
and, once again, quite revealing. The Minneapolis Star reported:
Primary result of the decision in Minneapolis is expected to be a sharp
increase in the number of search warrants issued. Joseph A. Hadley; head
of the city attorney's criminal division from 1929 to 1954, said he could
remember only two search warrants issued in that period. The city at-
torney's office has no record of any issued since 1954.34
When, some months after Mapp, a Minnesota trial court excluded
illegally seized evidence for the first time in the state's history, the as-
sistant prosecutor handling the case commented: "To make a search
82 Parker, "The Caban Decision Made Life Easier for the Criminal," in Parker, Police,
supra note 12, at 117.
33 Parker, "The March of Crime," in Parker, Police, supra note 12, at 131. Consider, too,
Brooklyn District Attorney Edward Silver's statement, ABA, Summary of Proceedings of
Section of Criminal Law 26 (1962) that the Mapp case "established the rule that all evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure is in violation of the Constitution . . .and is inad-
missible in a state court."
34 Minneapolis Evening Star, Aug. 22, 1961, p. 9A, col. 1.
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and seizure incident to an arrest, the arrest will now have to be based
on more than mere suspicion"-a5 When, a year later, the city appeared
to be in the grips of the aforementioned "burglary wave," the police at
first blamed it on the "tighter restrictions" imposed by Mapp36 La-
mented the head of the Minneapolis detective bureau: "I'd have 20
guys in jail right now if we didn't have to operate under present search
and seizure laws."37
These stories made page one. Off page one was found the observation
of the state attorney general that:
[T]he Mapp case does not reduce police powers one iota. It only reduces
potential abuses of power. The adoption of the so-called "exclusionary
rules" does not affect authorized police practices in any way. What was
a legal arrest before, still is. What was a reasonable search before, still is.
88
I wonder how many citizens understood that if the police had reason-
able grounds to believe these "20 guys" had committed burglaries, they
could arrest them under present search and seizure laws? I wonder how
many were aware that if the police lacked such authority, not Mapp
but the same state and federal constitutional provisions which had been
on the books long before Mapp was ever handed down prevented them
from making the arrests? I wonder how many realized that the police
never had the authority to violate the law, only the incentive? And that
the principal contribution of Mapp was simply to reduce that incen-
tive? 9
When this point was made at a recent discussion of Minnesota police
procedures, it evoked some illuminating responses from the two law en-
forcement panelists present, Minneapolis City Attorney Keith Stidd,
and St. Paul Detective Kenneth Anderson-responses which demon-
strate well how those state courts which admitted into evidence the
fruits of illegal searches and seizures seemed to approve, even en-
courage, police misconduct:
CITY ATTORNEY STIDD: [Other speakers] have used the expression that
35 Minneapolis Morning Tribune, Dec. 28, 1961, p. 1, col. 1. [Emphasis added.]
36 See note 21 supra.
37 Ibid. (Calvin Hawkinson, who has since been appointed Chief of Police). [Emphasis
added.]
38 Mondale, "The Problem of Search and Seizure," 19 Bench & B. of Minn. 16 (Feb.
1962).
39 Unfortunately, the exclusionary rule does not completely remove the incentive; its de-
terrent capabilities are limited. A decade after his brilliant criticism of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), see Allen, "The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil
Liberties," 45 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1950), Professor Francis Allen pointed out that the overruling
of Wolf would have little, if any, impact on the substantial police activities directed to ends
other than the formal prosecution and conviction of offenders, e.g., "prevention" and bar-
rassment. See Allen, "Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf," in 1960
The Supreme Court Review 1, 37-40. See also Barrett, 'Tersonal Rights, Property Rights,
and the Fourth Amendment," 1960 The Supreme Court Review 46, 54-55.
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prior to the Mapp decision the police were violating the law all along. I
don't think it is really proper for us to put it that way when the courts
of our state were telling the police all along that the federal rules [barring
the use of illegally seized evidence] didn't apply in Minnesota .... The
[illegally seized] evidence was being brought into [Minnesota] courts
and the courts were receiving it . . . . Technically, there might have
been a violation, but the [Minnesota] courts were accepting this evidence;
they were getting convictions on it. I don't believe we should be critical
of the police and say, see how illegal and unlawful they were all this time.
DETECTIvE, A_=FRON: The point is that the county attorneys and de-
fense attorneys who tried these cases in Minnesota were well aware of
what the procedure was, that this was in violation of the federal rule, and
... no police officer lied upon the witness stand. If you were asked how
you got your evidence you told the truth. You had broken down a door or
pried a window open... oftentimes we picked locks. Now, we didn't like
this, but this is what the mores of society dictated . ... That this is
okay, it's been going on in Minnesota since it became a state, practically,
and if you didn't want to perform that way, we just couldn't use you as
a police officer.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained this time after time after
time. Now, your judiciary o.k.'d it; they knew what the facts were. Your
trial judges, your defense attorneys, knew, too.
40
At the risk of laboring the point, consider if you will the impressions
of the Administrative Assistant to the District Attorney of New York
County:
The experience of all who are employed in law enforcement demon-
strates that as long as evidence discovered through illegal searches or
items seized unlawfully were admissible in the course of criminal trials,
inevitably police-sometimes, I fear, working under the orders of prose-
cutors-continued to engage in that "direct action" that produced the
evidence ....
Let me give just one example. Several years ago I tried a case in
which one of the ablest and fairest police officers I have ever had the
pleasure of knowing testified. He was an extremely high ranking official
who had been in command of an important unit of the New York City
police force for a long period; a major function of the unit he commanded
was to arrest persons found to be in possession of certain items of contra-
band. Although he was universally respected by all who came in contact
with him, both in and out of law enforcement, at that time it was so
blithely and matter-of-factly assumed that police would rarely bother to
get search warrants, that these questions and answers took place upon
his examination during the trial, without the batting of an eyelash:
Q. Now, in all the time that you were in the [name of police unit]
as its commander, did you ever use a search warrant in entering a person's
apartment, home, flat, loft or anything, for the purpose of investigating
[crime]? A. No.
Q. I didn't hear you. A. No, I never did.
40 Minnesota ACLU Panel on "Police Searches and Arrests in Relation to Civil Liberties,"
May 18, 1963, broadcast on KUOM, July 25, 1963, recording on file in audio-visual exten-
sion service, University of Minnesota.
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Q. Did you ever see a search warrant, in all the time that you were
in the [name of police unit]? A. No, we never used and never applied
for one.41 [Brackets in original.]
The nature, depth, and lasting quality of the changes wrought by the
exclusionary rule, e.g., the extent to which the notions underlying the
fourth amendment are being or will be integrated into the policeman's
value system, will be the subject of debate for many years. But if the
incidents I have related are typical, and I think they are, prior to the
adoption of the exclusionary rule, state and constitutional provisions
had had virtually no effect on police attitudes and actions at even the
most superficial level; they had not even achieved "public conformity
without private acceptance .... ,,42
The police response to the Cahan and Mapp decisions was soon fol-
lowed by a "repeat performance" in the Nation's Capital. In July of
1962, a special District of Columbia committee of three distinguished
lawyers, headed by Charles A. Horsky (now Presidential Adviser on
National Capital Affairs), culminated their sixteen-month study of the
problem with the findings that "arrests for investigation" were un-
constitutional, unwise, and unnecessary." The Committee recommended
that "the practice should stop, and stop immediately."
44
Robert V. Murray, Chief of the District of Columbia Police Depart-
ment, was stunned. He recalled: "Back in 1947 a study was made by a
committee from the Bar Association of investigative arrests. At that
time they said investigative arrests were unconstitutional, and recom-
mended that such arrests not be continued. Nothing was done about
it."4 5 Why, Chief Murray, seemed to wonder, was something being done
about it now?
The Chairman of the Senate District Appropriations Subcommittee,
was wondering the same thing. He warned District officials, including
Board of Commissioners, President Walter N. Tobriner: "I hope no
action will be taken to implement this report."4 He went further. In
41 Kuh, "The Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisal of Its Impact in New York," 148
N.YL.J. No. 55, p. 4, col. 2 (1962). After noting this entry "on the 'plus' side of the Mapp
ledger," Mr. Kuh, I should point out, goes on to discuss a number of "'minus' entries."
42 Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude
Change," 2 J. Conflict Resolution 51 (1958). [Emphasis in original.]
43 District of Columbia Commissioner's Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation,
"Report and Recommendations," 22-41 (1962) [hereinafter cited as The Horsky Report].
The report did not deal with "arrests for investigation" "in the field," only those "which re-
sult in a person being taken to a police station and 'booked.' Id. at 4 n.2.
The Horsky Report and the "Police Answer" to it are appraised in Kamisar, Book Review,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 1502 (1963), reprinted in 2 Am. Crim. L.Q. 80 (1964).
44 The Horsky Report 69.
45 "Why So Much Crime in the Nation's Capital," U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 21,
1963, pp. 92-93.
46 Washington Post, July 27, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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effect he issued a second warning, this one to Chief Murray to resist
implementation of the report or elsel "As long as you need more money
from Congress," he told the Chief, "you will find people here interested
in listening to you. But when your backbone becomes twine string, you
are going to be in trouble when you come to Congress,
47
Several months later, Commissioner Tobriner disclosed that "there is
no doubt in any of the Commissioners' minds that such arrests ["for
investigation"] are unconstitutional.1 4 This did not end the matter.
Evidently the resolution of constitutional issues is not so simple. The
police, Comissioner Tobriner added, would be permitted to continue
the lawless practice until some "acceptable constitutional substitute"
was found.49
After some halting starts, and in "defiance" of a House District
Committee resolution urging still further delay so that legislation in-
creasing police interrogation powers could be considered, the long-
debated "ban" finally went into effect, March 15, 1963.10 The Washing-
ton Star tempered its criticism of the Commissioners with the observa-
tion: "Arrests for investigation are illegal and with the issue raised
they had no choice except to ban them. Nothing is gained, however, by
trying to gloss over the practical consequences in a city that is already
ridden with crime. This ban will hamper the police."' 1
The ranking Republican member of the House District Committee
was less temperate. He branded "the ban" "an arrogant action on the
part of the Commissioners"8" and a surrender to "political" and "racial"
pressure. 3
How many people, I wonder, realize that the order "banning" investi-
gative arrests does not affect prior legal norms one whit, only effectuates
them? How many comprehend that, although it has only recently been
enforced, "the ban" has always existed? Not, I suspect, many among
the millions of Look readers who were simply told that "a new city rule
imp6ses additional restraints on Washington police. Arrests for 'investiga-
tion,' a fruitful source of information on crime, are now banned."54
A curious consistency pervades the thinking of many police and prose-
47 Ibid.
48 Id., Dec. 17, 1962, p. B1, col. 8.
49 Ibid. [Emphasis added.]
50 Id., March 14, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
51 Washington Star, March 12, 1963, p. 10, col. 1. Generally, the Star attacked the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule and the ban on "arrests for investigation"; the Post defended both.
52 Washington Post, March 14, 1963, p. 1, col. 2.
53 Id., March 17, 1963, p. B2, col. 4.
54 Knebel, "Washington, D.C., Portrait of a Sick City," Look, June 4, 1963, pp. 15, 19.
[Emphasis added.] It is plain that the author of the story interviewed Chief Murray on
this point; there is no indication that he talked to any of the Commissioners or any member
of the Horsky Committee.
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cutors. If they pay no attention to "the law" unless and until they feel
the sanction, it is no less true that when they seek to change "the law"
they bother only with the sanction. Whether they resist change or strive
for it, "the law" itself counts for nothing. Only the sanction matters.
Thus, if the current efforts to repeal the McNabb-Mallory rule, in
so far as it applies to the District, succeed, Rule 5 (a) will still command
that an arrested person be brought before the nearest magistrate "without
unnecessary delay. 5 5 Warrants for arrest will continue to issue, requiring
that an arrested person be brought "forthwith" to the magistrate. Op-
ponents of the McNabb-Mallory rule are not seeking to amend Rule
5(a). They are not requesting lawful authority, within the limits marked
out by the "involuntary" confession cases, 56 to hold an arrested person
as long as necessary or convenient or desirable. All they want-and all
they need-is assurance that henceforth, when they violate Rule 5(a)
it will not matter.57
"NECESSITY," PARTICULARLY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND MILITARY BRANDS
As I have already pointed out, "police-prosecution minded" critics
of the judiciary none too subtly suggest that rules of evidence have
spawned crime "waves" and badly impaired law enforcement efficiency.
As I shall dwell on later, this type of criticism reflects a "populistic
mentality," an attitude which collides with the "rule of law." It is
characteristic of "a disposition toward ideological enthusiasm and politi-
cal passions, which proclaim great crises and announce their disbelief
in the capacities of ordinary institutions and their leaders to resolve
them."58 This current of thought and sentiment, which also manifests
itself in the claim of military necessity, overlooks that:
[O]ur nation at the time of the Constitutional Convention was also faced
with formidable problems. The English, the French, the Spanish, and
various tribes of hostile Indians were all ready and eager to subvert or
55 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
56 For recent discussion of these limits-whether they be viewed in terms of "involuntary"
confessions or at the point when the right to counsel "begins"-see Kamisar & Choper, "The
Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations," 48
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 55-61 (1963); Kamisar, "What is an 'Involuntary Confession'? A Com-
mentary on Inbau and Reid's 'Criminal Interrogation and Confessions,'" 17 Rutgers L. Rev.
728 (1963); Ritz, "Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Su-
preme Court," 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35 (1962) ; Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313 (1964).
57 H.R. 7525, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. provides that "in the courts of the District of Colum-
bia . . . statements and confessions, otherwise admissible, shall not be inadmissible solely be-
cause of delay in taking an arrested person before a commissioner . . . ." See 1963 Senate
Hearings 1. The proposal in S. 1012, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. is that "notwithstanding the pro-
visions of rule 5 ... or any other rule or statute of like purport, a voluntary admission or
a voluntary confession of an accused shall be admissible against him .... " Id. at 353.
58 Shis, The Torment of Secrecy 161-62 (1956).
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occupy the fledgling Republic. Nevertheless, in that environment, our
Founding Fathers conceived a Constitution and Bill of Rights replete with
provisions indicating their determination to protect human rights. There
was no call for a garrison state in those times of precarious peace. We
should heed no such call now."
Those who seek additional powers for the police readily identify their
demands with that of "national interest," "national good," "public wel-
fare," "public necessity," or some other symbol representative of a more
universal value scheme. More often than not, when someone invokes
such a symbol, "he is urging a decision, and not a reason for arriving
at it. The capturing of the symbol . . . is tantamount to the capturing
of the decision itself.260
As an astute political scientist has pointed out, these symbols are
"society's most effective analgesics"; "anchor rationalizations for policy-
caused pain." Without such concepts, he observes, "most presidents,
congressmen, governors, commissioners, managers, and mayors-and,
I should hazard, commissars, premiers and generals-would become
unnerved."6' 1 Furthermore, he notes that "the most discouraging aspect
of totalitarianism is not the power-lust of its leaders, but the ease with
which people adjust to losses in political freedom when that loss is
explained in terms of public necessity."6"
Keith Mossman, then Executive Vice President of the National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association, typifies the "necessity" approach:
There has never in the history of this country been a greater need for
effective law-enforcement. This country can no longer afford a "civil rights
binge" that so restricts law enforcement agencies that they become ineffec-
tive and organized crime flourishes. Law enforcement agencies must not
be handcuffed by the false and unrealistic application and expression of
individual civil liberties to the point that law-enforcement breaks down.63
Professor Rex Coliings, Jr., reflects the same mood:
We are losing the war against crime despite unparalleled police forces
and investigative agencies ....
Why . . . ? Perhaps it is because criminal justice has become badly
unbalanced. Too often it is justice for defendants without regard for the
needs and problems of law enforcement and the public .... We too often
forget that criminals are at war with society. Our armed forces are heroes,
but policeman is a dirty word. We overlook the times when the police and
military forces simultaneously fight the same enemy.64
59 Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military," in The Great Rights 102 (Cahn
ed. 1963).
60 J. Cohen, "The Value of Value Symbols in Law," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 893, 896 (1952).
61 Bailey, "The Public Interest: Some Operational Dilemmas," in Nomos V: The Public
Interest 96-97 (Friedrich ed. 1962).
62 Ibid.
63 ABA, supra note 33, at 103.
64 Colings, "Criminal Law and Administration," 1957 Ann. Survey Am. L. 93.
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Chief Parker of Los Angeles is equally fond of likening the police to
our military forces, and the criminal-perhaps it would be more accurate
to say a person suspected or accused of crime-to an enemy soldier.
Thus, he has felt "obligated" to warn that "the imposition of the ex-
clusionary rule might render the people powerless ... against the criminal
army." 65 He told the nation, in a televised debate on wiretapping and
eavesdropping that the police "are doing a more inadequate job every
day despite all the advancements that have been made in the professional
field of law enforcement because they are just like the U.S. Army in
Korea; they are limited like the Yalu River boundary, and the result
of it is that they are losing the war just like we lost the war in Korea."
' s
Since it is characteristic of those who demand additional power for
the police to freely invoke the military analogy, it is only fitting and
proper that we pause to examine some recent claims of "military neces-
sity."
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles8 T the argument was advanced
that unless ex-servicemen could be tried by court-martial for crimes
committed while they were in the armed forces, the discipline of the
military would be disrupted and its morale impaired. The Court was
not impressed. It did not fully grasp how "gving ex-servicemen the
benefit of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians ' 68 could
have such adverse effects. Apparently none has materialized.
The power to court-martial civilian dependents of overseas servicemen
for capital crimes was at issue in Reid v. Covert.6 9 The Government
urged that in light of present conditions of world tension, the concept
of military trial of civilians performing services for the armed forces,
"in the field," during time of war be expanded to reach dependents
accompanying the military forces overseas in time of peace.70 "Great
potential impact on military discipline," was said to ride on the outcome. 71
It is difficult to follow this reasoning. No one suggested that civilian
dependents could commit murder and other capital crimes with impunity;
only he method of trial was at stake. Moreover, the Government's own
figures demonstrated that the number of dependents-and all other civi-
lians accompanying the armed forces overseas-for whom general court-
65 Parker, "The Cahan Decision Made Life Easier for the Criminal," in Parker, Police 113,
118 (Wilson ed. 1957).
66 Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Debate 536.
67 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
68 Id. at 22.
69 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
70 Id. at 33-34.
71 Id. at 47 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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martial for alleged murder were deemed advisable averaged a little less
than two a year.72
The claim was made in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton73
that unless the power to court-martial overseas civilian dependents in
noncapital cases were sustained, a critical impact upon discipline would
follow. Considering that what was involved, spread over the world-wide
coverage of military installations, was about seventy cases a year (of
which more than half were economic control violations or offenses sim-
ply designated "other"), 74 the Court "doubted" that removing court-
martial jurisdiction would "bring on such a crisis."75
Of course, not all claims of "military necessity" have been met with
skepticism. To take the obvious example, at the start of World War II
some 70,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry were imprisoned-
most of them for as long as three years-without indictment or the
proffer of charges-pending inquiry into their "loyalty." 76 Again, the
argument advanced, that of necessity, is not easy to follow. Why, for
instance, did the persons of Japanese descent who made up one-and-one-
fifth per cent of the West Coast population constitute a greater menace
to safety than such persons in Hawaii, more than 30 per cent of the
Territory's population? 77
An important point, one that many would like to forget, is that:
The basic reasons for evacuation were submerged under the impenetrable
slogan of "military necessity." It was precisely this fact that made ptblic
criticism of the policy ineffective; that induced civilian heads of the War
Department to foster the evacuation; that forced Justice Department offi-
cials to an unwilling tolerance of the program; that turned aside the in-
vestigatory inclinations of Congress; and that fostered relaxation of the
Supreme Court's usual standards of review. 8
But:
The judgments made on the West Coast in the winter of 1942 were
largely nonmilitary in character: the reasons adduced to link resident Japa-
nese to military dangers were sociological (the Japanese are "almost wholly
72 Id. at 47-48.
73 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
74 Id. at 244 & n.9.
75 Id. at 244.
76 The early phases of the program were sustained in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). A later phase of the
detention program-the refusal to release admittedly loyal citizens except upon their ac-
ceptance of certain conditions-was invalidated in Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
See generally Grodzins, American Betrayed (1949); Rostow, "The Japanese American
Cases-A Disaster," in The Sovereign Prerogative 193 (1962); tenBroek, Barnhart & Mat-
son, Prejudice, War and the Constitution (1954); Dembitz, "Racial Discrimination and the
Military Judgment," 45 Colum. L. Rev. 175 (1945); Freeman, "Genesis, Exodus, and Leviti-
cus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law," 28 Cornell L.Q. 414 (1943).
77 See Grodzins, supra note 76, at 298-300; Rostow, supra note 76, at 200-05, 221-23.
78 Grodzins, supra note 76, at 370-71.
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unassimilated"); anthropological ("the racial strains are undiluted");
and political (many Japanese were "dual citizens, owing allegiance to the
Emperor"). As later research has shown, military officers did not in a
single instance rely on the large mass of scientific materials that had been
gathered about American Japanese .... 7
Whether or not there are extraordinary circumstances when neither
judges nor anyone else can reject a claim of "necessity,"80 I take it
that as bad as the statistics are, invasion by the criminal army is not
so "imminent" that the decisions of only the men on the firing line are
unreviewable. Therefore, I would like to examine two police interroga-
tion "necessities": "arrests for investigation" and precommitment delays.
When a United States Senate Subcommittee asked Chief Murray to
appraise the effects of an order prohibiting "arrests for investigation,"
he retorted: "There is no question in my mind that it will just about
put us out of business." 8' This statement cannot be unquestionably
accepted.
For the two years 1960-1961, only 5.7 per cent of those arrested for
investigation were ever charged; to put it another way, about seventeen
out of every eighteen so arrested were ultimately released. 2
Generally, the longer a person was held, the less likely he was to be
charged. Thus, of the 1,356 persons held for eight hours or more in
1960, only one-and-one-fifth per cent were charged; of the 690 held
for more than twelve hours that year, a shade under one per cent were
charged. 3
Although the standard of "probable cause" is not required when arrests
for investigation are made, it appears that such cause actually existed
in over fifty per cent of the cases."4 Thus, it is difficult to know how
many, if any, of the five or six per cent charged with a crime after an
investigative arrest would have escaped the processes of the law if
"the ban" had then been in effect.
If you have come with me this far, is it still beyond question that
"the ban" will put the Chief "out of business"? If so, consider this:
in 1960 and the first two months of 1961, arrests for investigation ran
from 318 to 435 a month.85 In March of 1961, the month the Horsky
Committee was appointed to study the problem, these arrests dropped
substantially; in April, the first full month of the Committee's existence,
79 Id. at 301-02; see Rostow, supra note 76, at 204, 219-22, 242-43.
80 As to whether the Japanese evacuation cases constituted such circumstances, compare
Warren, supra note 59, at 101-02, with Rostow, supra note 76, at 214-62.
81 Washington Post, July 27, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
82 The Horsky Report 34.
83 Id. at 39.
84 Id. at 58.
85 Id. at 83-84 (table 1).
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they dropped almost two-thirds, where they remained for the rest of
the year."'
If the practice is so "necessary" why did the mere publicity given
to the Committee lead to a sudden, drastic curtailment of the practice?87
Moreover, what does the failure of the curtailment to produce an increase
in the percentage of those charged signify? 88 That the decline was simply
a matter of police forbearance? If so, by the same token, could the
practice have been increased two, three, or four times if the police felt
that forbearance had gone too far?
In August of 1962, the month following the issuance of the Horsky
Report, the arrests under study dropped to eighty-four, almost one-half
of the 1961, and one-fifth of the 1960, figures.89 It stayed there for the
rest of the year, during the "debate" over implementing the reportY0
Now, if effectuating the ban would "just about put us out of business,"
why, in the face of an alarming and ever worsening crime problem, were
the District police rapidly and "voluntarily" putting themselves out of
business?
At least so far as the constitutional questions go, the problems raised
by the "arrests for investigation" are relatively simple. Not even that
can be said for the matters of precommitment detention. Thus, here,
the claim of "necessity" packs extra force.
There is ample difficulty in exploring what is at issue without arguing
about what is not. At the recent Senate hearings, three of Chief Murray's
brother officers did the latter. They testified, I submit, "for victory,"
not "for clarification."'" Each gave the distinct impression that whether
the police could question suspects at all was at stake.92
The McNabb-Mallory rule does not preclude all police questioning.
Chief Murray himself is authority for the proposition that "the least
amount of time any judge has indicated you can hold a suspect" is two
hours.9 Moreover, the two hours run from the time of arrest, not from
86 Id. at 7, 83-84 (table 1).
87 Id. at 7:
[N~o instructions, written or otherwise, were given to the members of the Police
Department when the Committee was appointed. The mere publicity given to the
Committee appears to have been sufficient to change the practice of individual of-
ficers-in every precinct, bureau and squad-far more than any event of the pre-
ceding five years.
88 See id. at 68-69.
89 District of Columbia Commissioners Press Release, Jan. 10, 1963, on file in the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law Library.
90 Ibid.
91 Cf. Hayakawa, "How to Attend a Conference," in The Use and Misuse of Language
70, 75 (Hayakawa ed. 1962).
92 See testimony of Chief Schrotel, 1963 Senate Hearings 286, 290; testimony of Sheriff
Michael Canlis, member, Board of Governors, National Sheriff's Association, id. at 298-300,
302; testimony of Superintendent Wilson, id. at 307, 314.
93 Joint Hearing Before the Senate and House District of Columbia Committees on the
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the time the first question is asked. And "it would be absurd to suggest
that police must arrest a person before they can ask him questions."94 As
United States Attorney Oliver Gasch told Chief Murray and his men
some years ago:
Interrogation of suspects prior to arrest is a valuable technique, and it is
widely utilized by the F.B.I.95
[An instructor at the FBI school] told me that ... they go into a man's
home and say to him, "I just want to talk to you about this situation.
You're not under arrest, you are free to go, but I have talked to a few
people and maybe you can help me solve this crime." Now the instruc-
tor ...a man of about 15 years' experience told me that the technique
has been found quite productive by their men in many different types
of cases.96
More recently, in a briefing on arrest procedures called by Chief
Murray pursuant to arrangements made with David Acheson, Gasch's
successor, an assistant prosecutor reaffirmed this point, and recalled
five "concrete examples" of prearrest interrogation successfully con-
ducted by District police.
9 7
How much interrogation time do the law men want? Need?
"Whatever period of time may be necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses that society has in mind," answers Chief Wilson. Forty-eight
hours is reasonable, suggests a member of the Board of Governors of
the National Sheriffs' Association 9 "Frequently, even 48 to 72 hours
is not enough," comments J. F. Coakley,' often called the "dean" of
American prosecutors. "[A]t least 24 hours, excluding days when
courts are not in session," insists the head of the International Associa-
tion of the Chiefs of Police.'
0 '
Six hours would be "a reasonable time," a period in which "the police
could do an effective job," contributes Chief Murray.' So he thought,
Increasingly Serious Crime Situation in the District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 631
(1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Joint Hearing].
94 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
95 Memorandum From Oliver Gasch to Chief Murray, reprinted in Hearings on District
of Columbia Appropriations for 1961 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 621 (1960). [Emphasis added.]
96 Transcript of lectures and discussions relative to the Mallory decision and its effect
on law enforcement, held jointly by the United States District Attorney's Office for the
District of Columbia and the Metropolitan Police Department, reprinted in Hearings on H.R.
11477, S. 2970, S. 3325, and S. 3355 Before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 409 (1958).
97 Unpublished transcript of briefing on arrest procedures by United States Attorney
Acheson and Assistants Duncan and Greenhalgh, on Sept. 11, 1962, at 20-25, on file in
the University of Minnesota Law Library.
98 1963 Senate Hearings 307.
99 Id. at 300 (Sheriff Canlis).
100 Coakley, "Restrictions in the Law of Arrest," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 2, 9 (1957).
101 1963 Senate Hearings 293 (Chief Schrotel).
102 1963 Joint Hearing 32.
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at least, in February of 1963. Nine months later he voiced some doubts:
I think . . . there are many cases that can be ready for court in much
less than 6 hours, but.., if a criminal knows that all he has to do is sit
tight for 6 hours, he may sit tight for 6 hours and not say anything. I
think a time limit should be decided by the judge, if it is a reasonable
length of time.
.... I think that if it is left without unnecessary delay, in other words
the trial judge can determine whether there is any unnecessary delay
103
This of course is what the judges are doing-right now. If when
all is said and done the head of the police department which feels the
brunt of the McNabb-Mallory rule is willing to "leave it to the courts"
-where it now is-why have we heard so much talk about the courts
"usurping" executive and legislative powers? T10
A six-hour limit suits David Acheson, United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia:
I think in some very high percentage of the cases a confession is made if
it is going to be made at all, within an hour or two, perhaps 3 hours after
arrest. . . . In the great majority of cases a confession is made fairly
promptly after arrest. Of course, a confession is withheld because the
defendant thinks the police have nothing on him. When he finds out they
do, he very frequently confesses. You get some cases like Killough in which
the police can not get anything on him and he will not confess even though
he is held for a few days. We certainly don't suggest that there is any
legislation that is practicable which would cope with a situation like that.
[To say that a suspect who knows that six hours is the limit will hold
out until that time has elapsed] is attributing a degree of sophistication
to even a hardened criminal that very few of them seem to possess. At the
present time for all practical purposes if he can hold out for 2 hours,
2Y2 hours, he is pretty well in the clear, but very few of them do.105
"Although 'necessity' will probably always be the justification claimed
for arbitrary action, it has little to merit judicial approval unless con-
ditions make it plausible." "' Whether conditions warrant the claim is
not easy to tell, for often "the social fact upon which such a plea must
103 1963 Senate Hearings 463-64.
104 Professor Fred Inbau has been particularly forceful in this regard. See, e.g., Inbau,
"Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand," 53 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 85, 86 (1962); Inbau, "Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions," 52
Nw. U.L. Rev. 77, 84 (1957); Inbau, "The Social and Ethical Requirements of Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution," 3 Crim. L.Q. 329, 351 (1960). But see Kamisar, "Public
Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some 'Facts' and 'Theories,"' 53 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 171,
175-76 (1962); Kamisar, "Some Reflections on Criticizing the Courts and Tolicing the
Police,'" 53 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 453, 456-58 (1962).
105 1963 Senate Hearings 443.
106 Knowlton, "The Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio and Due Process of Law," 49 Iowa
L. Rev. 14, 23 (1963).
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be decided consists of vague references to 'experience' expounded by
men whose original predilections or present interest control the con-
clusion they derive from their necessarily limited contact with social
reality.' 7 When the "needs" of police interrogation vary from six hours
or less to twenty-four or forty-eight or more, however, the "necessity"
slogan no longer looms impenetrable. Indeed, when "necessity" varies so
greatly, one recalls the words of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland: s "A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or
indispensably necessary."'1 9 The word "frequently imports no more than
that one thing is convenient, or useful .... ",,0
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE IMPACT
OF RULES OF EVIDENCE ON CRIME RATES
AND POLICE EFFICIENCY
I have suggested that the law enforcers' cries of despair at "restric-
tive" rules, as well as their demands in the name of "necessity," are
considerably exaggerated. Perhaps these points merit closer attention.
"Simple Logic"
No less a student of criminal law than Sir James Fitzjames Stephens
once observed: "No other punishment deters men so effectuall from
committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one of those
propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in
themselves more obvious than any proof can make them.'
If it ever were, the matter is no longer regarded as so simple. For
example, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment cited specific
instances against, as well as in support of, the deterrent value of capital
punishment"' and pointed out further that "several witnesses went so
far as to express the view that the existence of capital punishment might,
for some mentalities, be an actual incitement to murder." 113 If the death
penalty were a deterrent par excellence, it followed as a matter of simple
logic that the more people who witnessed it the greater would be its
salutary effect. But somehow it did not work out that way. Apparently
107 Id. at 16.
108 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
109 Id. at 414.
110 Id. at 413.
Ill Stephen, "Capital Punishments," 69 Frazer's magazine 753 (1864), quoted in Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, "Report, Cmd. No. 8932," fJ 57 (1953).
112 Id. at 335-39 (app. 6).
113 Id. at 338. One of these witnesses, Professor Thorsten Sellin, discusses these cases at
some length in Sellin, "The Death Penalty," 65-68 (1959), a report appended to Model
Penal Code (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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an ((open execution" "did not reform; it brutalized"; "it became the
parent, and not the destroyer of crime.1
1 1 4
Critics of "restrictive" court decisions strike poses no less confident
than those once assumed by proponents of capital punishment. Thus,
Professor Fred E. Inbau recently asserted:
I cannot answer the... point with any statistics of my own ... but some
simple logic is available to support the proposition that the McNabb-
Mallory rule does, and is bound to have, a crippling effect upon law en-
forcement in any metropolitan jurisdiction saddled with the rule.
... .To prohibit police interrogation-which, in effect, is what the
McNabb-Mallory rule does-means . . . that fewer crimes will be solved
and successfully prosecuted. More criminals will remain, at large, to com-
mit other offenses. At the same time the deterrent effect of apprehension
and conviction will be lost insofar as other potential offenders are concerned.
The crime rate is bound to be greater under such circumstances, and I do
not feel the need of statistics to support that conclusion. 1 5
Professor Inbau may be right-as far as he goes. Some would-be
criminals may be emboldened by restrictive rules of evidence. Some
may thereby be "freed" to commit another crime another day. Some
may even be attracted to a jurisdiction which has such rules. But what
of others? If, for example, many delinquents and young criminals act
the way they do out of frustration,"6 may not enlarged police powers
only compound the problem? Is there any reason to doubt that here,
as elsewhere, different people respond differently to the same type of
treatment?
Chief Judge David Bazelon recently reminded us:
We should be aware that if the protections of the Bill of Rights are
restricted we shall, in practice, be affecting directly the rights of only our
more deprived population. When we talk about arrests for investigation,
lengthy police interrogation prior to arraignment, and the like, the subject
under discussion is not you or me. We don't get arrested without probable
cause because, to put it plainly, we don't "look" as if we would commit acts
of violence and we do look as if it might not pay to trifle with our rights.
Nor would you or I be subjected to long interrogation by the police
without the benefit of counsel. Nor do you and I live in neighborhoods
where the police dragnet is used, and where suspects are subjected to
wholesale arrest.
So the issue really comes down to whether we should further whittle
away the protections of the very people who most need them-the people
who are too ignorant, too poor, too ill-educated to defend themselves. Can
we expect to induce a spirit of respect for law in the people who constitute
114 Select Committee on Capital Punishment, "Report," IT 44 (1930).
115 Inbau, "More About Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties," 53 J. Crim. L.,
C. & P.S. 329, 331 (1962).
116 See, e.g., Tunley, Kids, Crime and Chaos 69-70 (1962).
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our crime problem by treating them as beyond the pale of the Consti-
tution?" 17
If, as Gunnar Myrdal reported two decades ago, "a not insignificant
number of crimes of Negroes against whites are motivated by revenge
for discriminatory or insulting treatment, 1 1 8 is granting the police in-
creased powers-which in the past they have used disproportionately
often against Negroes and other minorities- - 1 9 the way to reduce
these crimes?
If "the average gang boy views the policeman as a kind of legalized
gangster, a man whose badge makes him immune to ordinary rules," 20
will a return to pre-Mapp and pre-McNabb-Mallory days enhance his
image of the symbol of the law?
If, as the slum-dwelling Puerto Ricans maintain, "the police.., abuse
innocent people by suspecting them of crimes and searching them in
public, causing them embarrassment"; 121 and if, as a Citizens Advisory
Committee of the Attorney General of California found, "conflict be-
tween teen-agers and police is often the result of police treatment that
117 Bazelon, "Law, Morality and Individual Rights," 9-10 (unpublished address of Aug.
20, 1963, to Juvenile Court Judges Institute and Juvenile Officers Institute, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, on file in the University of Minnesota Law Library).
118 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 975 (1944).
119 See generally Deutsch, The Trouble With Cops 63 (1955); President's Comm'n on
Civil Rights, "To Secure These Rights," 25-27 (1947); United States Comm'n on Civil
Rights, "Justice," 5-28 (1961).
A decade ago, what Captain G. Douglas Gourley of the Los Angeles Police Department
describes as "an intensive study of citizens' attitudes toward the police" based on "a sci-
entifically selected sample of 3,100 citizens" was conducted in Los Angeles. See Gourley,
'Police Public Relations," Annals, Jan. 1954, pp. 135, 138. This attitude survey disclosed,
Gourley, Public Relations and the Police 75 (1953):
31.8 per cent of the "white" respondents, 26.2 per cent of the Mexican respondents, and
only 14.0 per cent of the Negro respondents are convinced that the Los Angeles Police-
men are mostly men of unquestionable honesty; whereas, 2.0 per cent of the "whites,"
5.0 per cent of the Mexicans, and 9.1 per cent of the Negroes state that the police are
mostly men who are dishonest. Also, 34.8 per cent of the "whites" express a belief that
the Los Angeles Police always respect the Constitutional Rights of suspected criminals;
whereas, only 21.2 per cent of the Mexicans, and 12.1 per cent of the Negroes express
the same opinion. Furthermore, 11.1 per cent of the "whites," 44.4 per cent of the
Mexicans, and 38.2 per cent of the Negroes believe that the police are often consci-
enceless and brutal in performing their duties.
For the view that relations between the Los Angeles police and the city's Mexican-Amer-
ican population have "improved markedly" in recent years, but that "the Negro com-
munity grows more and more restive" as the result of continued "second-class citizen"
treatment, see Cray, "The Police and Civil Rights," Frontier, May 1962.
120 Salisbury, The Shook-up Generation 223 (1958).
121 Padilla, Up From Puerto Rico 268 (1958). See also Wakefield, Island in the City:
The World of Spanish Harlem 118, 121 (1959): "The cops in this neighborhood are not
looked upon by its people as protectors of life to whom you run in time of trouble. Rather
they are the enemies you run away from-and even that is dangerous .... In time of terror
a citizen of East Harlem thinks twice before calling the police."
Since this article was written, the Puerto Rican-Americans in New York were said to be
"reacting angrily to alleged prejudice and brutality on the part of the police"; one spokesman
charged that the police were acting as if they were "running a plantation." See Samuels,
"'I Don't Think the Cop is My Friend,'" N.Y. Times, March 29, 1964, § 6 (Magazine),
p. 28.
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appears to youth to be arbitrary, '122 is removing the ban on "arrests for
investigation," winking at searches and seizures without "probable
cause" and precommitment detention for twenty-four or forty-eight
hours, or as long as "necessary," likely to improve the situation?
Is Professor Inbau's "simple logic" a sufficient answer to Captain
Frederick Ludwig of the New York Police Department's Juvenile Aid
Bureau:
Why create crime? Why make young people avowed enemies of society?
Dangerous people must be handled, true. But why create hostility toward
the police? It would be much better for some police to simply stay inside
their station houses rather than to come out and arrest everyone in sight. 23
Or a sufficient answer to the Counsel to the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency:
[T]he excesses of [police] authority have a damaging effect on community
opinion, on the courts, and most important, on youths themselves-on all
youths. The effect on those who are not motivated to crime is to encourage
an attitude of distrust, suspicion, and resentment, not only of the police
but of the courts and authority generally-an attitude that goes with the
very criminal behavior the community wants to prevent.124
Chief Schrotel of Cincinnati recently observed that "people assembled
as spectators where an arrest is being made tend to side with the pris-
oner" and "sometimes ... openly attack the police in an attempt to free
the prisoner."'2  He is not alone. Police Commissioner Murphy of New
York reported that "attacks on the police were growing to unman-
ageable proportions."'2 Chief Cahill of San Francisco told of a "ridicu-
lous situation": by-standers "threw rocks and put one of our police
officers out of commission for some time" when he and his brother
officers tried to "take away" some people who were disturbing the
peace. 27 Another San Franciscan, a member of the city's police com-
mission, underscored this "new development": "Time and time again
a police officer making an arrest finds himself surrounded by a group of
bystanders who assist the suspect resisting arrest. In some cases they
have taken the suspect away from the officer, sometimes before his
identification has been established ... ,,12
122 Quoted in Salisbury, supra note 120, at 219.
12 Id. at 222.
124 Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction 434 (1963).
'25 "Will City Streets Ever Be Safe Again?" U.S. News & World Report, April 8, 1963,
p. 80.
128 Ibid.
127 ABA, Summary of Proceedings of Section of Criminal Law 20 (1962).
128 "Terror in the Streets-Beyond the Rise in U.S. Crime," U.S. News & World Report,
Dec. 24, 1962, p. 54 (excerpt from an address by Harold R. McKinnon, Esq.). See also Cray,
supra note 119, at 3:
Hostile crowds gather quickly when [Los Angeles] police make an arrest in Negro.
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Is it so plain that "relaxing" the standards of arrest, search and
seizure, and precommitment detention will remedy, or even substantially
improve, this alarming situation? Is it not possible that "relaxed" stand-
ards in the past have helped to bring about the present state of af-
fairs?129
Is it so difficult to perceive at least two dimensions to the problem?
If "simple logic" dictates that removing the "restrictions" on the police
will prevent some crime, is much more complex logic needed to support
the proposition that the resulting police conduct may stimulate other
crime? That it may embitter and confirm in crime perhaps as many,
perhaps more, than are deterred or lawfully incapacitated? I do not
know the answer. I am not a criminologist or sociologist or psychologist.
But then, neither is Professor Inbau. Nor most police-prosecution-
minded critics of the courts. I think I know this much--"simple logic"
does not carry us very far.
The "Numbers" Game
Not all police-prosecution-minded critics of restrictive rules of evi-
dence rest on "simple logic." Charts, tables, and graphs are also thrown
into the fray. Proponents of capital punishment may have to content
themselves with logic, reason, and common sense-the statistics have
not been kind to them.3 Not so opponents of the exclusionary rules.
Chief Parker, for example, is fond of pointing to "the facts"-"the
things they [presumably defenders of the courts] don't like to talk
about."'' Chief Murray's "prize exhibit is a graph showing a steady de-
crease in crime in Washington from 1953 to 1957 [the year of the
Mallory decision] and a steady rise thereafter."' 32 And Superintendent
Wilson has trotted out the Uniform Crime Reports to support the propo-
sition that "crime is overwhelming our society.' 3
Superintendent Wilson's participation in the "numbers game" is
neighborhoods. On Memorial Day in 1961, twice in July, and again in August of that
year, the riot squad was called out to break up crowds attempting to prevent officers
from making an arrest. In January, it took forty men from Venice station to put down
a riot triggered when two policemen tried to make an arrest at a party. A week later,
raids on two after-hour speakeasies in Negro neighborhoods resulted in suspensions for
two officers. Newsmen arrived in time -to take pictures of the $8,000 damage to the
houses wrecked in a search; the outcry from the Negro community coupled with the
unprecedented-if good humored-newspaper coverage forced an investigation and the
suspensions.
129 See notes 119, 128 supra.
130 See, e.g., Sellin, supra note 113, at 34-63.
131 Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 76 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 House Hearings].
132 Knebel, "Washington, D.C., Portrait of a Sick City," Look, June 4, 1963, pp. 15, 19.
13 Wilson, "How Do We Live with Mallory, Mapp and Sun?" (unpublished comments
of Aug. 13, 1963, pp. 2, 4 in the University of Minnesota Law Library).
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perhaps the unkindest cut of all. A former dean of the University of
California School of Criminology, he has, on other occasions, mani-
fested an awareness of the treacherous nature of crime statistics. When,
upon taking command of the Chicago Police Department in March 1960,
he drastically revamped the department's method of reporting crime
and maintaining records, he warned that the new system's more ac-
curate reporting would create the impression of a "crime wave." Mean-
ingful comparisons could not be made, he stressed, until the system had
been in operation a full year.134 Common practices of the pre-Wilson
era, it seems, were not to report stolen cars as stolen in statistical
records if they were recovered within three days, and for a commander
"to follow a practice of ignoring a lot of the little stuff to save work
and make the district look better on paper."'135
When, more than a full year after his new system of reporting went
into effect, Chicago crime continued to rise, the Superintendent had a
ready explanation:
Wilson attributed the rise to an increase in reporting. A massive publicity
campaign was conducted, urging the public to call POlice 5-1313 when a
crime occurred. The message was repeated on billboards, in newspapers
and on radio and television. Wilson said that this campaign-and increased
confidence in the police-encouraged people to report crimes they would
not have reported in the past. 36
Superintendent Wilson's glib use of statistics to support his criticism
of the courts is surprising for another reason. In 1963, a year-and-a-half
after his new system of reporting had gone into effect, the tide did begin
to turn in Chicago. The first four months of 1963 saw an overall de-
crease of 6.6 per cent in Part I offenses.'37 A small increase in the
larceny category had the effect, the press pointed out, of "obscuring the
almost incredible subtotal that indicates a 21.7 per cent drop in crimes
against persons.'
38
The reduction in the latter categories was impressive: some 169
fewer rapes in the first four months of 1963 than in 1962; 843 fewer
robberies; a thirty-three per cent drop in "serious assault"; a twenty-
one per cent falling off in homicide.139 The Chicago-Sun Times reported
in June of 1963:
134 See Braden & Petacque, "The Turning Point: Chicago Cuts Crime," Chicago Sun-
Times, June 2, 1963, p. 3, col. 2; Gowran, "Wilson Plea: More Radios, More Records,"
Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 8, 1961, pp. 1, 8, col. 1.
For instances of New York and Philadelphia "crime waves" which turned out to be
"statistical reporting waves," i.e., sharp increases produced by the installation of new and
better recording systems, see Bell, "What Crime Wave?" Fortune, Jan. 1955, pp. 96, 99.
135 Gowran, supra note 134, at 1, col. 1.






Wilson thinks it is fair to say that the average Chicagoan is in fact 21.7
per cent safer in.his person. And the credit for this, Wilson believes, is
the growing effectiveness of the preventive patrols-patrols that are now
planned through scientific analysis and that are sent into action by a space-
age communications system.140
"I hope, and have a little reason to believe," Superintendent Wilson
told the citizens of Chicago, "that we may wind up '63 with about
twenty per cent less crime than in '62, which would be a remarkable
thing. But beyond that, I hope that we'll be able to continue the same
thing at a less steep decline into '64, '65, '66.'' 141 Wilson, the police
chief, was elated. He had a right to be. But Wilson, the courts' critic,
was unperturbed.
Two short months later, speaking at the American Bar Association
meeting, he cited some Uniform Crime Report figures and solemnly
declared:
The basic freedom underlying all other freedoms is the right to be free from
criminal attack .... No society can exist if crime overwhelms it and it
seems to me that this prospect is not beyond possibility.
It seems to me that our constitutional guarantees must be interpreted in
the light of our ever-increasing crime rate .... In the name of protecting
individual liberties, we are permitting so many technicalities to creep into
our system of criminal justice that... crime is overwhelming our society.
1 42
Later the same year, when the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
the District of Columbia asked him whether it was his "feeling" that
court restrictions "have accounted for the increase in crime in your
city," Superintendent Wilson replied in the affirmative; he had "this
conviction."' 4 3
Another aspect of Superintendent Wilson's contribution to the "num-
bers game" deserves attention. Both in his testimony before the Senate
Committee and in his talk before the bar association, Wilson pointed
to England and other common-law countries. These nations have not
been handicapped by restrictive court decisions, he observed; they "have
not permitted themselves to become overwhelmed by crime."'144 The Su-
140 Braden & Petacque, "Wilson's Answers-and Hopes," Chicago Sun-Times, June 6,
1963, p. 3.
141 Ibid.
142 Wilson, supra note 133, at 1, 3-4.
143 1963 Senate Hearings 316. [Emphasis added.]
144 Id. at 315. Wilson, supra note 133, at 4; English courts admit illegally seized evi-
dence. See, e.g., Williams, "The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law: England," in
Police Power and Individual Freedom 105 (Sowle ed. 1962). Although the handling of
suspects is guided by the Judges' Rules in England, rules which forbid interrogation after
arrest and require a police officer to caution a person when he has decided to charge him
with a crime, a judge has the discretion to admit or exclude statements obtained in viola-
tion of these rules and "since about 1950 they have almost uniformly been admitted."
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perintendent cited no authority for this proposition. Evidently, he simply
assumed that, unlike America, these other countries were suffering little
or no increase in crime. I must confess, so did I-until I came upon a
recently completed "Enquiry by the Cambridge Institute of Criminology
into Crimes of Violence against the Person."' 45 The following extracts
should suffice:
The number of indictable offences against the person [in England and
Wales] annually recorded by the police immediately before the Second
World War was 7,739; by 1950 the number of such recorded offences had
increased to 19,434, an increase of 151 per cent. Since 1950 the increase
has gone on steadily and, in 1960, the corresponding figure was 35,796,
representing a further increase of 84 per cent. Thus, comparing 1938 with
1960, it can be seen that during the last twenty years the number of offences
against the person, recorded by the police, has increased by 363 per cent.
[A] lthough sexual offences have increased at a greater rate than
crimes of violence, and account for more than half the offences in this
class [indictable offenses against the person], nevertheless crimes of vio-
lence have also shown a considerable increase, especially during the last
ten years. In 1938 the number of indictable offences of violence against the
person annually recorded was 2,721 and by 1950 the number had become
6,249, an increase of 130 per cent. During the past decade the number
increased from 6,249 to 15,759 and this represents a further increase of
152 per cent. The overall increase during the past twenty years means that
there are more than four times as many crimes of violence recorded by the
police today as in the years immediately before the Second World
War. ..
Crimes of violence against the person in England and Wales have shown a
steep upward trend over the past decade ...
When related to the size of the population crimes of violence increased
between 1950 and 1960 from 14.3 to 34.4 per 100,000 persons. This means
that the overall chance of a person being attacked rose from 3 to 7 in
20,000.147
Meanwhile, back in America, Superintendent Wilson was asking:
Williams, "Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations Under Foreign Law: England,"
in Police Power and Individual Freedom, supra at 187. Moreover, "the police need not ad-
minister the caution until they have obtained sufficiently incriminating statements to satisfy
them of guilt" and at this point "the utterance of the caution is unlikely to alter matters."
Id. at 185-86.
This year, the judges' Rules were superseded by new Rules which provide that "as soon
as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a
person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person .... " Following this caution,
"a record shall be kept of the time and place at which any such questioning began -and
ended and of the persons present." A second caution is to be given as soon as a person "is
charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offence." Thereafter, "it is only
in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence should be put to the accused per-
son." For the full text of the new Rules and several commentaries on them, see [1964]
Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.) 161-62, 165-82.
145 McClintock, Crimes of Violence (Cambridge Studies in Criminology: XVIII 1963).
146 Id. at 6-7.
147 Id. at 23.
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"how long can we tolerate annual crime increases of 3 per cent or
more?"1
48
The sharp increase in reported crimes of violence on the other side
of the Atlantic is instructive, but more illuminating, I think, is con-
sideration of the extent to which "the increase in recorded crimes of
violence indicates a real increase in violent behaviour": 4 9
It was ascertained that in recent years there has been a marked tendency
towards greater uniformity and completeness in recording. This has un-
doubtedly led to an increase which is purely statistical in character.
There is strong evidence from interviews with older police officers, offi-
cials and residents in those neighbourhoods with a high incidence of violent
crime, to suggest that in the past, a considerable amount of violent be-
haviour was taken for granted and not notified to or recorded by the
police....
One of the main causes for an increase in the recording of violent crime
appears to be a decrease in the toleration of aggressive and violent be-
haviour, even in those slum and poor tenement areas where violence has
always been regarded as a normal and accepted way of settling quarrels,
jealousies or even quite trivial arguments.
The views of the police and others with practical knowledge of the
areas chiefly concerned suggest that there has been some real increase in
violent sexual crime, racial antagonism resulting in violence, violent be-
haviour by Irish labourers and coloured immigrants as well as that form
of violent behaviour by the young which is frequently referred to as
"hooliganism."' 150
We have seen, I trust, that any resemblance between a change in the
crime data and a change in "the facts" may be faint indeed. But I think
I can do better than that. I think I can show that taking the statistics
for all they are worth, they do not establish that rules of evidence have
produced a "crisis" in law enforcement.
As evidence of the severe blow the 1955 Cahan decision dealt Cali-
fornia law enforcement, Chief Parker pointed to the reduction in
narcotic arrests. 5 ' True, adult felony arrests for narcotic law violations
in California did drop a bit in 1955, from 7,457 to 7,313 in absolute
numbers; from 60 to 56 per 100,000 population. 52 But what happened
in subsequent years? Narcotic arrests went over the 9,000 mark the first
full year after Cahan and climbed above 14,000 by 1960. The rate in-
148 Wilson, "Police Authority in a Free Society," 54 J. Crim. L. C., & P.S. 175-76 (1963).
149 McClintock, supra note 145, at 73.
150 Id. at 74.
151 Parker, "The Cahan Decision Made Life Easier for the Criminal," in Parker, Police
121 (Wilson ed. 1957).
152 Unless otherwise indicated, the documentation for the discussion of the Cahan after-
math is collected in Kamisar, "Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some 'Facts' and
'Theories,'" supra note 104, at 188-90.
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creased significantly the first full year after Cakan and rose to 89.2 per
100,000 by 1960, a 50 per cent increase over the pre-Cakan year. If Chief
Parker's reliance on the 1955 narcotic arrest data was well placed, what
do the more recent figures establish?
J. F. Coakley, District Attorney for Alameda County, also sounded
the alarm, announcing that Cahan "has broken the very backbone of
narcotics enforcement."'15 Mr. Coakley cited no data and the only
statistical support I can find for his sweeping statement, aside from the
aforementioned arrest figures, are (1) the rate of felony complaints
per 100,000 filed in California superior court, which did fall from
twenty-two to eighteen in 1955, and (2) the percentage of narcotic con-
victions in California Superior Courts, which dropped from 86.6 in 1954
almost ten full points to 76.8 in 1956.
In 1957, the rate of narcotic complaints passed the pre-Cahan rate,
and climbed still higher in subsequent years. The percentage of nar-
cotic convictions, however, while it has slowly climbed back over the
seventy-seven per cent mark is still appreciably short of the pre-Cahan
marks of 82.5 (1952), 84.4 (1953), and 86.6 (1954).
In appraising these figures, several additional factors should be taken
into account: (1) although the current narcotics conviction percentage
is lower than pre-Cahan years, there has been an increase in both the
rate of arrests and felony complaints filed for these offenses. Thus, in
1959-1960 twenty per cent more persons were convicted of narcotic
offenses in California superior courts than in the record conviction per-
centage years of 1953-1954. (2) Only possession cases have been sig-
nificantly affected. For example, while the 1960 overall narcotics con-
viction percentage in California superior courts was 77.5, the percentage
for both sales of marijuana and sales of narcotics other than marijuana
were 88.2 and 88.7 respectively. Of the 460 narcotic cases dismissed in
1960, "there were only a total of 33 sale cases and 9 sale to minor cases
dismissed." (3) Since 1955, the Cahan exclusionary rule has, of course,
operated state-wide. But the post-Cahan conviction rate in narcotic of-
fenses fell substantially only in Los Angeles; almost no change was re-
corded in other parts of the state. Ruling out the exclusionary rule
factor,154 the felony conviction rate for narcotics offenses in Los Angeles
153 ABA, supra note 127, at 58.
154 According to a six-months study (Aug. 1, 1960, through Jan. 31, 1961) made by the
District Attorney's Office, County of Los Angeles, to determine the effect of the exclusionary
rule on narcotic cases, "approximately eight percent" were rejected by the prosecution or
dismissed by the court for this reason. See Cal. Special Study Comm'n on Narcotics, "Final
Report," 112 (1961). I have suggested elsewhere that the "true figure" may well be lower.
See Kamisar, 'Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some 'Facts' and 'Theories,"' supra
note 104, at 189.
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would still be lower than the rate of most other California areas-
taking into account the exclusionary factor.
I am not sure what all this proves. I am confident that it does not
prove Cahan "broke" the "very backbone" of California narcotics en-
forcement. Moreover, since narcotic offenses probably constitute the
major category of crime most likely to be affected by the exclusionary
rule, this data constitutes even less impressive evidence of the exclu-
sionary rule's adverse effect on law enforcement generally. It hardly
demonstrates that the rule is "catastrophic as far as efficient law en-
forcement is concerned"; 15 that "many states have adopted [it] . . .to
the joy of the criminal and the detriment of society"; 15 that it is "the
'Magna Carta' for the criminals.'
157
Indeed, some "facts" seem to lean in the other direction. The post-
Cahan conviction percentages for murder, manslaughter, and felony
assault all increased; variances 'in conviction rates relating to robbery
and burglary were barely discernible. The overall felony conviction
percentage averaged 85.4 for the three years immediately preceding
Cahan, registered 85.4 for the year of the Cahan decision, and hit an
average of 86.1 (including the lower narcotic percentage) for the five
years immediately succeeding Cakan, only once dipping as low as 85.5.
In asking-and doubting-whether "we can live," inter alia, with
the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases, Chief Wilson ob-
served: "The effectiveness of a free society in controlling criminals
may be measured in part by its success in convicting defendants."' 58
To this extent, there is reason to think that the people of California
can live with Cahan and Mapp.
Perhaps because Chief Murray and his predecessors have lived with
the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases for some fifty years,
this rule has caused no beating of breasts and gnashing of teeth in the
District of Columbia. Murray's principal target has been the 1957
Mallory decision and "the facts" he likes to talk about are (1) a sub-
stantial increase in District crime since 1957, 159 and (2) a significant
drop in the clearance rate since that time."
It is no great feat to come up with "crime waves." One easy way
155 Parker, Police, supra note 151, at 114.
156 ABA, supra note 127, at 54 (Chief Carl Hansson of the Dallas Police Department).
157 Ibid. (unidentified California assistant attorney general).
158 Wilson, supra note 133, at 3.
159 See, e.g., Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 6 of the House Committee on the District
of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 [hereinafter cited as 1963 House Hearings]; 1963
joint Hearing 6-7, 20-21; 1963 Senate Hearings 77, 452, 455, 465.
160 1963 House Hearings 75; 1963 Senate Hearings 77, 452, 455, 457, 474; "Why So
Much Crime in the Nation's Capital," U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 21, 1963, pp. 92, 94.
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is to select a low-point year as the base year and take it from there.
The year 1957 will do just fine, for it happens to be the all-time low
for crime under the District's modern reporting system. 1"
The "aggravated assault" category, the only crime category in which
the District ranks number 1 for cities of its size, 6" has furnished Chief
Murray with some of his most potent "facts."' 6 There were 470 more
cases of aggravated assault in fiscal year 1963 than in fiscal year
1957.164 This increase is disturbing, but it does not, I submit, fulfill the
Chief's dire prediction that "if the Mallory decision stands, it will re-
sult in complete breakdown in law enforcement in the District of Co-
lumbia.' 6 5 Even with this substantial increase, 1963 saw 1,583 fewer
cases of aggravated assault than did 1952-the all-time high for crime
in the District under the current reporting system.166 Moreover, it was
not until two full years after the much-maligned Mallory case that the
incidence of "aggravated assault" rose even perceptibly, and it has yet
to approach the peak "aggravated assault" years of 1953-1955.167
The incidence of "aggravated assault" has always been high in the
District. Why? Chief Murray suggested a reason in a recent interview:
Question. Can you give any reason for Washington being the No. 1 city
in assaults?
Answer. . . . I'll say this: In this list of cities that I mentioned-16
cities of 500,000 to 1 million population-we'll run pretty close with the
other cities in homicides. There's no doubt about a homicide-if a person's
dead, he's dead--or about stolen cars-you can tabulate those. But in
aggravated assault, the figures are way off balance; we're way ahead of
the others. Now, whether there is a different system of reporting
Question. Different definition, maybe?
Answer. Could be.168
161 See 1963 Joint Hearing 20; cf. Tunley, supra note 116, at 29-30 summarizing a study
by Negley Teeters and David Matza made of Cuyahoga County, Ohio (which includes the
Cleveland metropolitan area):
In 1919, when World War I ended, the figures showed a delinquency rate of children
of 65.9 per 1,000. By 1920, the figure had dropped to 52, and by 1939, when the coun-
try was beginning to climb out of the Depression, the figure was down to 21. In 1957,
however, the figure had swelled to 33.5. This represents an increase of 70 percent over
the 1939 one, a period when our current statistics also began to soar. But compared
with the post-World War I era, they show an over-all drop. Unfortunately, such fig-
ures do not exist for the country as a whole. If they did, we might easily find that all
our comparisons are made with periods of low delinquency.
Since this article was written, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons has pointed
out that although 1962 saw a substantial increase in bank robberies over 1961, many more
banks were held up for a much greater aggregate loss in 1932 than in 1962. He also ob-
served that the present homicide rate is about half what it was in 1930. See Bennett, "A
Cool Look at 'The Crime Crisis," Harper's, April 1964, pp. 123-25.
162 1963 Joint Hearing 7, 20. This category, according to the Chief, presents his men
with their "greatest problems. 1963 Senate Hearings 469.
163 See, e.g., 1963 joint Hearing 7, 16, 20.
164 H.R. Rep. No. 579, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963)..
165 1957 House Hearings 42.
166 See note 164 supra.
167 See 1963 Joint Hearing 16.
168 "Why So Much Crime in the Nation's Capital," supra note 160, at 97. Ronald Beattie,
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Comparative figures, whatever they are worth,16 9 also disclose that
the District is faring badly in the robbery category. The capital city
now ranks third out of sixteen comparable cities in this category,170 and
the post-Mallory change does seem astounding-an overall increase
of 115 per cent from fiscal years 1957 to 1962.11
A closer look at these figures, however, reveals that they are some-
what misleading. The incidence of robbery did not increase very sub-
stantially until 1959-1960 and the sharp increase-which accounts
for the great bulk of the 115 per cent figure--did not begin until 1960-
1961.12There were fewer than one hundred more robberies in 1959 than
in 1957; indeed in 1959 there were forty-three fewer robberies than in
1958 and only thirty-six more than in 1956. Moreover there were fewer
robberies in 1958 than in 1954 or 1955. But 1960 saw an annual increase
of more than two hundred and fifty and the next two years an addi-
tional increase of more than seven hundred.
It would seem more precise, therefore, to talk about the sharp rise
in robberies since 1960, or at the earliest, since 1959. But precision is
not everything. There are other values. There is, for example, the need
to underscore the relationship between the increase in crime and the
1957 Mallory decision.
Nowhere is this need more evident, I think, than in the police officers'
use of clearance rate data.173 "Under the hampering effect of the Mallory
the much-respected Chief of the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, has made an im-
pressive showing that various cities are using such disparate methods in crime reporting that
"the differences observed in Uniform Crime Reports simply cannot be accepted as possessing
any degree of reliability for showing true differences in crime rates." Beattie, "Criminal
Statistics in the United States," 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 49, 54 (1960); cf. Tunley, supra
note 116, at 28:
One of the interesting sidelights of the so-called American tendency to "promote
delinquency by statute" was evident at a recent United Nations conference in London.
The Americans found that in order to make any sort of valid comparison with the
European representatives it was necessary to take out of our statistics those youngsters
picked up for things a European would not be picked up for. The American delinquency
rate automatically dropped 50 percent!
169 See note 168 supra.
170 1963 Joint Hearing 20.
171 Id. at 137. As if this were not bad enough, District of Columbia police like to talk
about a 142 percent jump-from fiscal year 1957 to calendar year 1962. Id. at 132-33.
172 Id. at 15, 133.
173 The "clearance rate" reflects the percentage of reported offenses "cleared by arrest,"
whether or not the arrestee is later convicted or even indicted. I assume for purposes of this
discussion that the rate is-as police officials obviously regard it-a significant index of a
police department's "efficiency." But I share the doubts raised in Foote, "Safeguards in the
Law of Arrest," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 16, 23-24 (1957).
Since a man arrested for one burglary may confess to 29 others and thus "clear" 30 at
one sitting-even though he is not prosecuted for any of them-the recent drop in the
District's "clearance rate" could conceivably stem largely from the inability of the District
police to hold a suspect long enough to get him to confess to crimes other than, or in addi-
tion to, the one for which he has been arrested. In any event, when Senator Alan Bible
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ruling and corollary decisions," maintains Chief Murray, "our rate of
offense clearance has decreased";174 it "started down," he insists, "when
the Mallory decision was handed down."1 75 Joins in Deputy Chief John
Layton: "Our overall rate of clearance from 1957 to 1962 has dropped
about eight [actually nine] per cent."'
1 76
The "facts" are that the District's clearance rate dropped seven full
points in the two fiscal years immediately preceding Mallory; rose three
points in the two years immediately following that decision-to 60.7,
the highest in four years and the second highest in ten-and only
then began to drop.'
77
To say that the drop in the clearance rate "started" with Mallory
is to misrepresent. To say that the rate has dropped nine points since
Mallory is to mislead. The rate rose three points in 1957-1959, then
dropped twelve points in 1960-1962. For police spokesmen to break it
down this way would be more accurate, but no doubt less "effective."
For it would loosen "the link" between Mallory and the reduced
clearance rates.
That link is a strong one, to hear the Chief talk about it: "We feel
kind of bad," he reveals, "because our clearance rate is not 58 per cent
as it has been." 78 It would be "back to 58 per cent," he vows, "if the
Mallory decision is corrected by enacting legislation." 79 I wonder how
many who heard or read that statement had any notion that two years
after Mallory-and without any "correcting" legislation-the District
clearance rate was "back" to 60.7 per cent.
So far, I have been talking about "facts" opponents of the McNabb-
Mallory rule like to talk about. But there are other facts. The "forcible
rape" category for example.
That Mallory freed a "rapist" to roam the streets and alleys in search
of new victims was well publicized. Were rapists attracted to the Dis-
trict? Were local rapists emboldened? A few months after the decision,
the incidence of rape began to drop. And it continued to drop-over
30 per cent from 1957-1962, setting all-time lows in 1961 and 1962.180
Deputy Chief John Winters supplied the House and Senate District
(forearmed by the testimony of Dean A. Kenneth Pye that although the District's clearance
rate had dropped it was still 1509 above the national average) pressed Chief Murray to
explain why "the city police departments which do not have the Mallory restriction to con-
tend with lag so far behind the Metropolitan Department in this measure of police effi-
ciency," the Chief could not do so. 1963 Senate Hearings 474.
174 Id. at 452.
175 Id. at 465.
176 1963 joint Hearing 136.
177 Id. at 21.
178 1963 Senate Hearings 474.
179 Ibid.
180 1963 joint Hearing 14, 20.
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of Columbia Committees with some unwieldy "facts" concerning juve-
nile crime in the district:
The total crime picture in the District of Columbia for fiscal year 1962
reflected a 1.2 per cent decrease as compared to fiscal 1961. Juvenile delin-
quency increased 17.7 per cent during the same year as compared to the
year before .... A noteworthy decrease in crime in the District of Colum-
bia would have occurred in fiscal 1962 if it had not been for the increase
in offenses committed by juveniles.' 8 '
Nowhere, so far as I can tell, does Chief Murray come to grips with
these figures. What is his theory? That the Mallory decision attracted
juvenile offenders to the Capital, but not adult criminals? That juvenile
perpetrators of crime calculate nicely the length of time during which
they may be interrogated by the police before deciding whether to beat
up somebody or snatch a purse, but adult offenders do not?
The most fundamental difficulty with the use of post-1957 "facts"
to attack the Mallory decision remains to be considered. It is the under-
lying premise that the holding was something new, something aston-
ishing. It was not. Even Professor Inbau-perhaps the harshest critic
of the Mallory decision-recognizes that the 1957 case reaffirmed the
1948 Upskaw case, which, in turn, reaffirmed the 1943 McNabb case.'
Indeed, sixteen years ago, Professor Inbau attacked McNabb on the
very grounds he criticized Mallory last year. 83 And twenty-one years
ago, Major Edward J. Kelly, then head of the District of Columbia
Police Department, manifested no less horror at the McNabb rule than
does Chief Murray today. Said Major Kelly in 1943:
I feel.., that the ruling in the McNabb case is one of the greatest handi-
caps that has ever confronted law enforcement officers.
I say that we should be granted a reasonable time for the police and in-
vestigating officers to conduct a proper investigation, so that all cases where
a crime has been committed should be brought to a proper conclusion
181 Id. at 105, 121.
182 1963 House Hearings 208; 1963 Senate Hearings 323-24, 326. The references are to
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410
(1948).
True, the precise meaning and scope of the McNabb case was unclear, but from the out-
set the Department of Justice seemed to grasp the general idea. See, e.g., the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Circular No. 3793, dated April 1, 1943:
The attention of all United States Attorneys is directed to two recent decisions of the
Supreme Court reversing convictions because of the admission of confessions made
while the accused were illegally detained by enforcement officers. McNabb v. United
States; Anderson v. United States, decided March 1, 1943. . . . Although the opinions
refer to circumstances, e.g., ignorance of the accused, discomforts of place of detention,
extended questioning, which might be regarded as bringing into question the voluntary
character of the confessions, the decisions are expressly based upon failure of the ar-
resting officers to comply with statutory duty to bring arrested persons before a com-
mitting magistrate with reasonable promptness.
183 Inbau, "The Confession Dilemma in the Supreme Court," 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442 (1948).
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without any doubt whatsoever. It is drastically hard enough in these
critical days, with the added population we now have in the District of
Columbia and the many, many other handicaps occurring on account of
the national emergency.
[Y]ou will have a greater number of murders and other serious crimes
committed here that will not be brought to proper justice or definite con-
clusions, and frankly I do not know whom they are going to hold responsi-
ble .... If this great handicap to investigating officers and policemen ...
is allowed to continue ... I do not know, and I am frank to say, who is
going to be responsible for the solving of said cases. 18 4
If the impact of the McNabb-Mallory rule on law enforcement and
the crime rate is at issue, is not 1943 as deserving of the "base year"
designation as 1957? Or 1948, the year McNabb was reaffirmed? Is it
fair to ask whether these earlier dates were rejected as "base years"
because since then, the District's crime and clearance rates have fluctu-
ated up and down and up again? Because since then, notwithstanding
Major Kelly's gloomy prophesy if McNabb were to stand-and it did
-District police achieved some of their greatest gains in the "war"
against the "criminal army"? Because in the 1950-1960 decade, al-
though the national crime rate soared 98 per cent the District's rate
barely rose at all, and its incidence of rapes, aggravated assaults, and
grand larceny actually decreased? Because, though neither Virginia nor
Maryland were "handcuffed" by the McNabb-Mallory rule or the fed-
eral exclusionary rule during this ten year period, the overall felony
rate per 100,000 population increased much more in the three Virginia
and Maryland suburbs of the District for which generally complete
figures are available than it did in the District itself? 85
Since 1960, alarming crime reports have been coming out of the
Nation's Capital. But there is no need to blame the bad news on the
Supreme Court-or the police-or the Congress. Somebody has blamed
it on the Congress, by the way. The "primary fault" for the sorry
conditions in the Capital, it has been said, "lies with the District
Committee in Congress, whose Southern membership for many years
deliberately starved all community needs of the city out of sheer
hostility to a population of 800,000 which is now 54 per cent Negro and
which has an 84 per cent Negro school population"; thereby creating
a "backlog of social, educational and economical problems of such a
184 Hearings on H.R. 3690, Serial No. 12 Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 57 (1943).
185 The documentation for this paragraph is collected in Kamisar, "Public Safety v. In-
dividual Liberties: Some 'Facts and 'Theories,"' 53 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 171, 185 (1962).
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serious nature that they have become insoluble without speedy federal
intervention.'
1 86
There is no shortage of candidates. In the space of one week in March
of 1960, for example, when the recent trend was becoming apparent,
the following occurred: (1) the United States Attorney pointed the
finger of blame at the "woefully and demonstratively understaffed" Ju-
venile Court, ill-equipped to "win away from a life of crime those bor-
der-line juvenile delinquents"; 187 (2) one District Commissioner found
the "main reason" in "more probations" "earlier paroles" and the fact
that "drunks are sometimes sent home rather than to jail";"88 and (3)
another Commissioner disputed this, but suggested that "the cutback
in the activities of the Metropolitan Police Boys Club"'8 9 was a factor.
In the Washington, D. C. public schools, "discipline is a mocked word.
The drop-out rate, 39 per cent, runs above the national average .... It
is a city where illiteracy increased slightly in the last decade, while de-
clining in all the states .. . .One principal reported that only 13 per
cent of her kindergarten, first and second grade pupils have any one
at home when they return from school." 90
The Nation's Capital leads all other large cities in the rate of illegiti-
mate births-twenty per cent of all live births in 1961. Few other cities
show a rate even half that high. Girls in the city's public schools, ages
twelve to fifteen, gave birth to 265 illegitimate babies during the last
school year.' 91 In the age group 15-19, the venereal disease rate is more
than ten times the national average. 192
For the past 15 years, "unemployed, penniless, and desperate young
Negroes . ..have been swarming into the city from the urban and
rural slums of the South"; "it is estimated that at least 10,000 and
probably some 13,000 young Negroes between the ages of 16 and 21
have nothing to do but roam the streets."' 93 Conversely, there has been
an exodus to the suburbs by the more stable well-to-do white families. 194
186 Meyer, "The Nation's Worst Slum: Washington, D.C.," Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1963,
pp. 89-90, 92.
187 Gasch, "Law Enforcement in the District of Columbia and Civil Rights," 6 (un-
published address of March 25, 1960, to Twelfth Annual Conference, National Civil Liberties
Clearing House in Washington, D.C., on file in the University of Minnesota Law Library).
In the same address, Gasch, who had wrestled with the McNabb-Mallory rule for 6 years,
dismissed the suggestion that it was responsible for the increase in crime as "much too
speculative." Id. at 7 quoted in MacKenzie, "Mallory Ruling Held Blameless in Crime Rise,"
Washington Post, March 26, 1960, p. Dl, col. 7.
188 Id., Mar. 27, 1960, p. A.27, col. 6 (Commissioner Robert McLaughlin).
189 Ibid. (Commissioner David Karrick).
190 Knebel, "Washington, D.C.: Portrait of a Sick City," Look, June 4, 1963, pp. 16, 18.
191 "The Blight in the Nation's Capital," U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 37.
192 Ibid.
193 Meyer, supra note 186, at 89.
194 Id. at 90.
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What is more surprising? That crime has increased as much as it has
in the District? Or that it has not increased more? That the city ranks
first out of sixteen comparable cities in aggravated assaults? Or that
it only stands ninth in housebreaking, tenth in forcible rape, eleventh
in larceny? And that it only ranks eighth-just "about average" -in
overall crime index offenses per capita?195
Perhaps the Cohens, father and son, said all that can be said about
these matters. The older Cohen pointed out that the decline of Rome
"can be attributed by equally conscientious and intelligent historians
working from a common fund of historical data to such diverse factors
as the exhaustion of soil, the corruption of rulers, the rise of Chris-
tianity, spots on the sun, and population movements in Central Asia."'96
Why? Different value judgments, he suggested.' If anything, such
factors play a greater role in contemporary criticism. As son Felix put
it:
When one man finds the cause of high prices in high profits, another in
high wages, and a third in high taxes, we recognize that three different
value patterns are being applied to the same set of facts. That, perhaps,
is why statistical facts and figures seldom sway anybody's viewpoint in
such a controversy.9 8
THE "POPULISTIC MENTALITY" AND THE "RULE OF THE LAW"
Although he does not specifically consider the problem at hand, Pro-
fessor Edward Shils' penetrating discussion of "populism" and the "rule
of law" illuminates police-prosecution-minded criticism of the judi-
ciary:
Populism proclaims that the will of the people as such is supreme
over every other standard, over the standards of traditional institutions,
over the autonomy of institutions and over the will of other strata. Popu-
lism identifies the will of the people with justice and morality.
Populism seeks substantive justice. It cares not at all for the traditional
rules in spheres of life outside its own immediate sphere. It regards the
legal system as a snare for the guileless, a system of outdoor relief for
lawyers and judges.
Populism acclaims the demagogue who, breaking through the formalistic
barriers erected by lawyers, pedants and bureaucrats, renews the right-
eousness of government and society. Populism is impatient of checks and
195 1963 joint Hearings 20; I am discussing rankings in terms of offenses per capita, not
"actual number" of offenses; the rankings vary slightly. 1963 Senate Hearings 461.
198 M. Cohen, The Meaning of Human History 114 (1947).
197 Ibid.




balances, it is restive under the restraints imposed by the separation of
powers.
The rule of law is a delicately balanced affair and it must withstand bat-
tering from many sides. The populistic mentality, when it has full sway,
denies the claims to autonomy .. .of the judiciary which it views as the
resistant custodian of a law which sets itself above the will of the people.199
If the popular will were completely unfettered in a "democracy," if
there were no "rules of the game"-if "democracy" were really so
simple-then, as Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. has remarked:
Our Bill of Rights is a thoroughly undemocratic document .... One need
read no further than the first five words of the First Amendment: "Con-
gress shall make no law... ." Since Congress could be presumed never to
make a law which its majorities did not believe to be desirable, the only
possible force of such a prohibition is to forbid laws which the elected
representatives of the people believe to be desirable. If the Bill of Rights
does not operate to thwart the temporary will of the majority, then it does
not operate at all. 00
The "populistic mentality" crops up in much of the criticism of the
exclusionary rule and other "liberal" decisions. Listen to the head of
the Los Angeles Police Department:
Lincoln referred to a government "of the people, for the people and by the
people." The police are the servants of the people and it is contrary to
public welfare to ...hamper the police in the conscientious performance
of their duties, through the gratuitous imposition of the exclusionary
rule. . 201
An official of the National Sheriffs' Association, quoting Jefferson
with approval: "It is a very dangerous doctrine to consider the judges
as the ultimate arbitrators of all constitutional questions. It is one
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy." 2 2
A law professor who has attacked the exclusionary rules for decades:
How are we to halt this travesty on justice, make the guilty pay for their
crimes, and bolster the public safety? One way would be for the informed
and incensed public ... to cry out against each and every criminal turned
loose on a mere flyspeck of technicality.
An outpouring of indignation sooner or later would be heard by the courts
despite their paper buttresses of precedent, and they would cease to en-
courage criminals and criminality at the expense of the public safety,
public decency and public good.203
199 Shils, The Torment of Secrecy 98-104, 160-61 (1956).
200 C. Black, "The Supreme Court and Democracy," in The Occasions of Justice 66
(1963).
201 Parker, Police, supra note 151, at 118.
202 1963 Senate Hearings 303 (Sheriff Michael Canlis of San Joaquin County, California).
203 Waite, "Why Do Our Courts Protect Criminals?" American Mercury, Jan. 1956, pp.
55, 60.
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The Director of the Chicago Crime Commission:
Judicial abuses [unlike police abuses, according to the Director]".' . for
the most part go unnoticed. Decisions based solely on political or other
outside influences are usually reviewable by no one.... An arbitrary deci-
sion that wrongfully turns loose a dangerous criminal is couched in "lan-
guage of compelling mechanical logic." Because of the complexities of the
law, the virtual impossibility of determining the true motives that prompted
the decision, and the wide latitude properly given judicial discretion,
judicial abuses are seldom publicly aired in the press. As a result, judicial
abuses are not subjected to any measure of effective popular control.
The objective is to protect real constitutional rights-not the highly
technical and unrealistic theories of reasonableness that have characterized
so many judicial decisions in applying the exclusionary rule of evidence....
If abuses arise that are not covered by existing laws, the legislature is
the proper body to consider, draft, and enact new legislation. This pro-
cedure would be fair to our law enforcement officials. Police officers are
also people-people with rights that are certainly entitled to as much
protection as the courts extend to criminals. 20 4
The head of the Chicago Police Department, 2 5 voicing sentiments
adopted verbatim by the Chief of the Cincinnati Police Department in
his recent testimony before a Senate Committee:
The [appellate] court ponders the alleged infringement of the rights of
the convicted person as a legal abstraction and feels obliged to consider
the question as it-would apply were the individual innocent . . . . [T]he
desires of the general public for some reasonable measure of security and
for a redress of the wrong done to the innocent victim of the criminal are
not made known nor are they readily available to the court. ... Statesmen
representative of the people seem better qualified to make fair appraisals
of public needs than appellate judges who, by virtue of their positions, are
not so responsive to the desires of the public.
206
Is it not one of the distinct advantages of judicial review that an
appellate court is better able than the trial judge to withstand "out-
pourings of indignation"? Public demands "for a redress of the wrong
done"?2" 7 Is not a court supposed to resist such pressures when it con-
siders an alleged violation of a constitutional or statutory right? What
else are procedural rights all about?
204 Peterson, "Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure," 52 Nw. UJL. Rev. 46, 60,
63 (1957).
205 Wilson, "Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization," in
Police Power and Individual Freedom 21-22 (Sowle ed. 1962).
206 1963 Senate Hearings 287 (Chief Stanley Schrotel, immediate past president of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police). Although, so far as the record shows, Chief
Schrotel is presenting his own views, a comparison of his testimony with Wilson, supra note
205 reveals that much of his testimony consists of verbatim extracts from the Wilson article.




In his thoughtful book, Professor Alexander Bickel reminds us of a
"truism":
It is that many actions of government have two aspects: their immediate,
necessarily intended, practical effects, and their perhaps unintended or
unappreciated bearing on values we hold to have more general and perma-
nent interest. It is a premise we deduce not merely from the fact of a
written constitution but from the history of the race, and ultimately as a
moral judgment of the good society, that government should serve not only
what we conceive from time to time to be our immediate material needs
but also certain enduring values. This in part is what is meant by govern-
ment under law.
Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capa-
city to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which
may have been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry. This is what Justice
Stone called the opportunity for "the sober second thought." Hence it is
that the courts, although they may somewhat dampen the people's and
the legislatures' efforts to educate themselves, are also a great and highly
effective educational institution.208
But Professor Bickel also reminds us of something else, something
which goes a long way toward explaining why police chiefs are making
so much noise of late and, I might add, why those approving of recent
decisions are making some noise too: "The Court is a leader of opinion,
not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose
its own; and-the short of it is-it labors under the obligation to
succeed. °9
Although Bickel made this next point in connection with the School
Segregation Cases and their aftermath, his point has general application:
The Supreme Court's law, the southern leaders realized,' could not in our
system prevail . . . if it ran counter to deeply felt popular needs or con-
victions, or even if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority
and received with indifference by the rest of the country. This in the end,
is how and why judicial review is consistent with the theory and practice
of political democracy. This is why the Supreme Court is a court of last
resort presumptively only.
210
THE "SPECIALIST" VERSUS THE "AMATEUR" OR "OUTSIDER"
Critics of recent decisions contend that judges are so lacking in first-
hand knowledge of police problems that they have no business "policing
the police"211 (I prefer to call it enforcing the Constitution); these
208 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 24, 26 (1962).
209 Id. at 239.
210 Id. at 258.
211 See, e.g., Inbau, "Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand,"
53 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 85-86 (1962); Peterson, "The Crooks Get All the Breaks," Satur-
day Evening Post, Sept. 23, 1961, pp. 10, 13; Waite, "The Legal Approach to Crime and
Correction," 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 594, 600-01 (1958).
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critics feel, in effect, that the courts' "absentee management" is de-
stroying law enforcement's effective freedom of action. 12
Thus, prosecutor J. F. Coakley insists that we seek the answer to the
question whether "the emphasis on civil rights and privileges has been
distorted"21L-whether "the pendulum has swung too far to the left" '214
-from those engaged in law enforcement work, from "those on the
firing line."215 Thus, Deputy Chief Edgar Scott suggests that "we
recognize that each branch of the government is the proper authority to
regiment its 'own troops' and to enforce its own ground rules. 21 6 Thus,
Professor Rex Collings protests:
It is fine to have decisions which bring a roar of applause from the galleries
at the "joint" [San Quentin] .... But what of the wife and five children
of that policeman who was murdered a few weeks ago? What of that
girl who was waylaid and brutally raped by four men in turn? . . .I
understand that one Supreme Court Justice has been known to spend a
night in a police prowl car. Perhaps there are a few other judges, and even
a law professor or two, who might profit by a similar experience.
217
Such critics overlook that-to quote from the recent Horsky Re-
port:
"[E]fficiency" [in the narrow sense] cannot be the touchstone for criminal
procedure. The proudest traditions of common-law criminal procedure
hamper efficiency to some extent-because we wish to protect the innocent
as well as convict the guilty, and because we wish to treat all prisoners,
innocent or guilty, in ways that fit in with the kind of society we want.218
"Communism," as Herbert J. Muller has observed, "has been effi-
cient enough-it has made Russia a great power in a single generation
.... The reason why the rest of us are not simply dazzled by the Rus-
sian achievement is its human costs. The major issue between democracy
and Communism is a moral issue. It comes down to the ideal of free-
dom-freedom not as expedience, but as justice.1
219
"Communism," historian Muller continues, "looks like the speediest,
most effective way of developing and organizing modern technology,
at least for backward countries starting from scratch. Having made
Russia a world power in one generation, it bids fair to make another
such power of China. 220 But-happily-we do not distinguish the
212 Cf. Fuller, "Freedom-A Suggested Analysis," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1305, 1316 (1955).
213 ABA, Summary of Proceedings of Section of Criminal Law 58 (1956).
214 Ibid.
215 Id. at 57.
216 Scott, "The Mallory Decision and the Vanishing Rights of Crime Victims," Police,
July-Aug. 1960, pp. 28, 30.
217 Collings, "Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-An Amicus Brief," 50
Calif. L. Rev. 421, 428 (1962).
218 The Horsky Report 49.
219 Muller, The Issues of Freedom 157 (1960).
220 Id. at 161.
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ways of Mao Tse-tung and Nehru in terms of their technical achieve-
ments alone.22'
That many police officers resent the control or influence of judges,
to say nothing of the "interference" worked by citizens' committees and
law professors, is understandable. As psychologist Hans Toch recently
observed:
Since the police officer obtains his rewards and satisfactions from the suc-
cessful identification of persons responsible for misconduct, and since such
success is "confirmed" through prosecution, conviction and sentencing, any
interference with this sequence may be experienced as terribly frustrating.
In instances where the law itself blocks the road from suspicion to disposi-
tion, the law becomes an enemy of its ostensible servants .... Police can
no more .be expected to subscribe to the premise that persons whom they
perceive as violators must be protected, than decided hunters are likely
to grant the immunity of deer
222
No doubt similar unhappiness about the control or influence of "out-
siders" and "amateurs" led delegates to the Air Force Association's
Fifteenth Anniversary National Meeting to adopt a ringing Statement
of Policy, proclaiming, inter alia, that "national policy must prescribe
that the choice between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons is neither
moral nor political but is essentially a military consideration."2 " No
doubt similar frustration over "outside interference" caused the resign-
ing coach of a losing University of Iowa basketball team to protest:
"Recruiting has become tougher and tougher. We can't get a lot of good
kids in school.., because the entrance requirements seem to get higher
each year. Every time you turn around there is another rule staring
you in the face.1
224
Too often the specialist-be he police chief, army general, or college
coach-who bristles at "outsiders" or "amateurs" only manages to
manifest his indifference to values and goals he was supposed to be
taking into account all along. We should welcome the specialization
which furnishes a man with "the skill and knowledge as well as the
motive for doing a task up to a moderate level of efficiency. ' 225 We
221 Cf. Montgomery, "Public Interest in the Ideologies of Natural Development," in
Nomos V: The Public Interest 218-19 (Friedrich ed. 1962).
222 Toch, "Psychological Consequences of the Police Role," 6-7, (unpublished symposium
presentation delivered at Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Sept.
1, 1963, on file in the University of Minnesota Law Library).
223 The immediately preceding paragraph urged--"should the military situation dictate"
it-the unhesitating use of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression "whether that
aggression take the form of nuclear attack, nonnuclear attack, nuclear blackmail, aggression
by Soviet satellite nations, infiltration, or subversion." The full text of the Statement of
Policy appears in Air Force & Space Digest, Nov. 1961, pp. 8-9.
224 Minneapolis Tribune, March 2, 1964, p. 24, col. 1. How conference leader Michigan,
whose entrance requirements are presumably no lower, managed to achieve national ranking
was not explained.
225 Shils, The Torment of Secrecy 156 (1956).
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should resist the specialization which reaches the point "where under-
standing and sympathy for the other realms with which collaboration
and a sense of affinity are necessary are obstructed."226
From the vantage point of many a police-prosecution-minded critic,
no doubt, courts are manned by "amateurs.", But "we have a legal
system which entrusts its case-law-making to a body who are specialists
only in being unspecialized." '227 To a body designed "to reach a judg-
ment which adds balance not only . . . against the passing flurries of
public passion, but no less against the often deep but too often jug-
handled contributions of any technicians.""22
Chiefs Schrotel and Wilson are right. The law is abstract. And often
it is "cold comfort in the face of the individual human crises which are
the stuff of police work. '229 But these crises are "not conducive to re-
flection about what the general rules ought to be. This is why the law
has wisely insisted that other functionaries do the judging.1230
If I may be permitted to make still another analogy to the military
-with a tip of the hat to Clemenceau-law enforcement is too im-
portant a business to be left to the police and the prosecutor.
226 Ibid. Of course, within a specialty, the zealousness of one subspecality may obstruct
collaboration and a sense of affinity with another. As the Executive Assistant to the Super-
intendent of the Chicago Police Department has pointed out: "A group of officers intent on
solving a homicide, for example, will complain bitterly of the lack of prostitutes on the
streets from whom they may obtain information." H. Goldstein, "Police Discretion: The
Ideal Versus the Real," 23 Pub. Admin. Rev. 140-41 (1963). Similarly, although military
men may bristle at control by "civilian academic types," see Newsweek, May 29, 1961, p. 24,
and advocate a "hot line" between the joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress, see U.S. News &
World Report, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 70, "too often," according to a former Deputy Defense
Secretary, "the President and his other policy advisers are confronted with a fractured
military position reflecting divergent service views rather than differing military judgments."
Gilpatric, "An Expert Looks at the Joint Chiefs," N.Y. Times, March 29, 1964, § 6 (Maga-
zine), pp. 11, 72.
227 Llewelyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 262 (1960).
228 Ibid.
229 Weisberg, "Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View," in Police
Power and Individual Freedom, supra note 205, at 153, 171.
230 Ibid.
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